Amal Awad was tired of seeing books that explored the lives of Arab women from a western perspective. She set out to interview women of Arab heritage from both the Middle East and in Australia, as a Palestinian-Australian woman herself.
Amal Awad talks about the fascination with Arab women and their lives; the misconceptions that abound; and how Arab women respond in her upcoming book, Beyond Veiled Clichés – The Real Lives of Arab Women.
Opportunities and challenges in evaluating national public health programs delivered through regional service organisations
Local involvement in how programs are delivered and implemented is supported by many working in community development and increasingly seen as important in public health, particularly in preventive health programs. Yet there are challenges for national program evaluation when decisions on implementation are devolved. These tensions play out in determining: how to define, standardise and measure national objectives, what measures to use in evaluation and who is responsible for collecting and analysing the data.
In contemporary settler societies reconciliation has emerged as a potent and alluring form of utopian politics.
Associate Professor Ben Phillips of the ANU Centre for Social Research and methods will be providing an introduction to ‘PolicyMod’ the recently developed ANU tax and transfer policy simulator. The presentation will detail the policies that are modelled and the underlying data and methodologies.
This paper concerns what has come to be called ‘moral luck’. It begins with Adam Smith’s account of the problem, and then moves to the problem’s scope. It is argued that some of our sentiments in such cases may have their origin in views about moral pollution we no longer accept, and that this may provide an argument in favour of a volitionalist ethics. The paper closes with some discussion of the implications of and problems for such an ethics.
It is topical in moral psychology to equate the abilities required for being deserving of blame with the abilities required for being an appropriate addressee of the reactive attitudes. The most influential account of these abilities is reason responsiveness (McGeer & Pettit, 2015; McKenna, 2012; Shoemaker, 2015; Wallace, 1996; Watson 1993).
Please join the ANU School of History in welcoming Professor David Armitage, FAHA, for the 2017 Allan Martin Lecture
Tuomas E. Tahko (University of Helsinki): Where Do You Get Your Protein? Or: Biochemical Realization
Biochemical kinds such as proteins pose interesting problems for philosophers of science. They can be studied both from the point of view of biology and chemistry, but these different perspectives may result in different classificatory practices. I will examine the tension that such classificatory differences produce. The reducibility of the biological functions of biochemical kinds to the chemical structures that realize these functions is a key question here. This leads us to a more general discussion of multiple realizability and realization at the biology-chemistry interface.
New provisions in the Aboriginal Land Rights Act (ALRA) are forecast to see a six-fold escalation in land recovery from 2017 through negotiated settlement. Criticism of the slow and protracted native title determination in New South Wales will also see more expeditious processing of claims currently in place over more than 35 per cent of the state. These predominant land recovery statutes will have significant crossover with the conservation estate and Aboriginal land management interests, unique land grants (such as Goat Island) and divestment of the Crown Land estate.
What is the role of affective experience in explaining how desires provide us with reasons for action? When we desire that p, we are disposed to feel attracted to the prospect that p, and to feel averse to the prospect that not p. In this paper, we argue that these affective experiences – feelings of attraction and aversion – provide us with reasons for action in virtue of their phenomenal character. Moreover, we argue that desires provide us with reasons for action only because they are disposed to cause the phenomenal character of affective experience.