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Updated: 2 hours 20 min ago

Keith Horton

Sun, 2017-03-26 01:14
Date and time:  Mon, 05/06/2017 - 12:30 - 14:00 MSPT seminar School of Philosophy Location:  Coombs Seminar Room B

Serene Khader

Sun, 2017-03-26 01:13
Date and time:  Mon, 22/05/2017 - 12:30 - 14:00 MSPT seminar School of Philosophy Location:  Coombs Seminar Room B

Matthew Lindauer (ANU)

Sun, 2017-03-26 01:12
Date and time:  Mon, 15/05/2017 - 12:30 - 14:00 MSPT seminar School of Philosophy Location:  Coombs Seminar Room B

Luke Roelofs: Revelation, Confusion, and Panpsychism

Tue, 2017-03-14 11:11
Thursday Seminar Date and time:  Thu, 16/03/2017 - 03:30 - 05:30 Location:  Coombs Seminar Room A

Constitutive panpsychists face a dilemma over what is sometimes called the ‘revelation principle’, according to which being in a conscious state teaches you the nature of that conscious state. On the one hand, they rely on some version of this principle in arguing against physicalism. On the other hand, the principle seems to support a simple argument against constitutive panpsychism itself: human consciousness doesn’t seem introspectively like the combination of a trillion micro-consciousnesses, and given the revelation principle, if it were that, it would seem that way.

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Revelation, Confusion, and Panpsychism

Mon, 2017-03-06 14:24
Date and time:  Thu, 09/03/2017 - 15:30 - 17:30 Location:  Coombs Seminar Room A

Constitutive panpsychists face a dilemma over what is sometimes called the ‘revelation principle’, according to which being in a conscious state teaches you the nature of that conscious state. On the one hand, they rely on some version of this principle in arguing against physicalism. On the other hand, the principle seems to support a simple argument against constitutive panpsychism itself: human consciousness doesn’t seem introspectively like the combination of a trillion micro-consciousnesses, and given the revelation principle, if it were that, it would seem that way.

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Catherine Waldby (ANU)

Tue, 2017-02-28 14:52
Date and time:  Mon, 08/05/2017 - 12:30 - 14:00 MSPT seminar Location:  Coombs Seminar Room A

Alex Bellamy (UQ)

Tue, 2017-02-28 14:51
Date and time:  Mon, 24/04/2017 - 12:30 - 14:00 MSPT seminar Location:  Coombs Seminar Room A

Jensen Cass

Tue, 2017-02-28 14:50
Date and time:  Mon, 10/04/2017 - 12:30 - 14:00 MSPT seminar Location:  Coombs Seminar Room A

Suzy Killmister (UCONN): Dignity for the Cognitively Disabled

Tue, 2017-02-28 14:48
Date and time:  Mon, 03/04/2017 - 12:30 - 14:00 MSPT seminar School of Philosophy Location:  Coombs Seminar Room A

Many theories of dignity - including one I've defended myself - have the unpalatable implication that individuals with severe cognitive disabilities lack dignity. Since dignity is commonly taken to be the feature in virtue of which individuals are owed basic forms of respect, this implication is one that should be resisted. In this paper I explore a novel way of including the severely cognitively disabled within the realm of dignity.

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Philip Pettit (ANU/Princeton): Two Concepts of Free Speech

Tue, 2017-02-28 14:47
Date and time:  Mon, 27/03/2017 - 12:30 - 14:00 MSPT seminar School of Philosophy Location:  Coombs Seminar Room A

Free speech raises a question, first, as to what speech options ought to be free and, second, as to what makes a speech option free. This paper assumes that any plausible ideal will require that a wide range of speech options should be free and explores the issue of what makes them free. There are broadly two responses: one, the fact that the exercise of those choices is unhindered, the other the fact that that exercise is protected (and, as we may assume, consequently unhindered).

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Stephanie Collins

Tue, 2017-02-28 14:45
Date and time:  Mon, 20/03/2017 - 12:30 - 14:00 MSPT seminar Location:  Coombs Seminar Room A

Anne Schwenkenbecher (Murdoch): Collective moral action problems, responsibility gaps, and global justice

Tue, 2017-02-28 14:39
MSPT seminar Date and time:  Mon, 06/03/2017 - 12:30 - 14:00 Location:  Coombs Seminar Room A

Collective moral action problems can be puzzling. Sometimes there appears to be a gap between what each of us ought to be doing and what we together ought to be doing: we have to act when I do not. In order to understand how responsibility gaps arise, we need to distinguish between different kinds of collective goods – incremental and fixed-sum – and different types of actions to produce them – genuinely cooperative and distributive actions. In contrast to fixed-sum goods, incremental goods can be produced in degrees.

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David Kinney (LSE): Choosing a Level of Causal Description: A Pragmatic Approach

Mon, 2017-02-27 15:12
Philsoc seminar Date and time:  Tue, 14/03/2017 - 15:30 - 17:30 Location:  Coombs Seminar Room A

Several recent authors in philosophy of science—including Weslake (2010), Woodward (2010, 2016), Weatherson (2012), and Franklin-Hall (2016)—argue that the most appropriate description of a particular causal relationship in nature is not necessarily the most detailed or fine-grained description of that trend. My goal in this essay is to provide a methodology for choosing the appropriate level of description for a given causal relationship.

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Kantian Communitarian Contractarianism and its Institutions

Thu, 2017-02-23 13:28
Thursday Seminar Date and time:  Thu, 23/02/2017 - 15:30 - 17:30 Location:  Coombs Seminar Room A Hartmut Kliemt

Kantian Communitarian Contractarianism and Its Institutions

Hartmut Kliemt

Abstract
Fundamental characteristics of recent non-Kantian, non-communitarian “contractarian” approaches are summed up graphically to the right [see below]. These approaches grew out of a rational choice and game theoretic tradition of explaining and justifying the emergence of social order and the state as equilibria of interaction described in terms of Folk theorem logic, growth of conventions etc. (Michael Taylor, Andrew Schotter, Robert Sugden, Brian Skyrms or Ken Binmore and Robert Axelrod).

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Luke Roelofs (ANU)

Sat, 2017-02-04 21:05
Philsoc seminar Date and time:  Tue, 14/03/2017 - 15:30 - 17:30 Location:  Coombs Seminar Room A

Sarah Sorial (UOW)

Thu, 2017-02-02 23:16
MSPT seminar Date and time:  Mon, 13/02/2017 - 12:30 - 14:00 Location:  Coombs Seminar Room A

Susan Pennings (ANU): Responsibility-sensitive health care and the Abandonment Objection (TPR)

Mon, 2017-01-23 13:01
Philsoc seminar Date and time:  Tue, 07/03/2017 - 15:30 - 17:30 Location:  Coombs Seminar Room A

Many luck egalitarians argue that social institutions should prioritise neutralising the disadvantages people face which are a result of unchosen social or natural causes, over disadvantages caused by individuals' own reasonably avoidable choices. One of the main objections to luck egalitarianism is known as the Abandonment Objection, which argues that luck egalitarianism is implausibly harsh towards people suffering as the result of their own choices.

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Jesse Hambly (ANU)

Mon, 2017-01-23 12:28
Date and time:  Tue, 06/06/2017 - 15:30 - 17:30 Philsoc seminar Location:  Coombs Seminar Room A

Michael Yuen (ANU):TPR

Wed, 2017-01-18 14:51
Date and time:  Tue, 16/05/2017 - 15:30 - 17:30 Philsoc seminar Location:  Coombs Seminar Room A

John Zerilli (ANU)

Wed, 2017-01-18 10:29
Date and time:  Tue, 30/05/2017 - 15:30 - 17:30 Philsoc seminar Location:  Coombs Seminar Room B

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