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Updated: 2 hours 2 min ago

James Owen Weatherall (UCI)

Fri, 2017-05-26 09:19
Date and time:  Tue, 29/08/2017 - 15:30 - 17:30 Seminar Philsoc seminar School of Philosophy Location:  Coombs Seminar Room A

Melissa Fusco (Columbia)

Fri, 2017-05-26 09:15
Date and time:  Tue, 22/08/2017 - 15:30 - 17:30 Seminar Philsoc seminar School of Philosophy Location:  Coombs Seminar Room A

Cailin O'Connor (UCI)

Fri, 2017-05-26 09:12
Date and time:  Tue, 15/08/2017 - 15:30 - 17:30 Seminar Philsoc seminar School of Philosophy Location:  Coombs Seminar Room A

Amy Kind (CMC)

Fri, 2017-05-26 09:07
Date and time:  Tue, 08/08/2017 - 15:30 - 17:30 Seminar Philsoc seminar School of Philosophy Location:  Coombs Seminar Room A

Connie Rosati (Arizona)

Fri, 2017-05-26 08:40
Date and time:  Tue, 18/07/2017 - 15:30 - 17:30 Seminar Philsoc seminar School of Philosophy Location:  Coombs Seminar Room A

David Chalmers (NYU & ANU)

Fri, 2017-05-26 08:34
Date and time:  Tue, 11/07/2017 - 15:30 - 17:30 Seminar Philsoc seminar School of Philosophy Location:  TPA

Janice Dowell (Syracuse)

Fri, 2017-05-26 08:30
Date and time:  Tue, 27/06/2017 - 15:30 - 17:30 Seminar Philsoc seminar School of Philosophy Location:  Coombs Seminar Room A

Una Stojnic (NYU & ANU)

Fri, 2017-05-26 08:27
Date and time:  Tue, 20/06/2017 - 15:30 - 17:30 Seminar Philsoc seminar School of Philosophy Location:  Coombs Seminar Room A

Alex Sandgren (ANU): In Defence of Idiosyncrasy

Fri, 2017-05-26 08:25
Date and time:  Tue, 13/06/2017 - 15:30 - 17:30 Seminar Philsoc seminar School of Philosophy Location:  Coombs Seminar Room A

Abstract: A number of theories in the philosophy of mind (for example those of Quine, Lewis, Braddon-Mitchell, and Jackson) imply that ordinary agents do not often have beliefs with the same content. A common complaints made against these theories concerns communication, agreement, disagreement, and the norms of belief change. The natural explanation of these phenomena, the complaints run, requires that agents often have beliefs with the same content, so accepting these accounts compromises our ability to correctly explain these phenomena.

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Jakob Hohwy (Monash)

Thu, 2017-05-04 16:11
Date and time:  Thu, 01/06/2017 - 15:30 - 17:30 Seminar Thursday Seminar School of Philosophy Location:  Coombs Seminar Room A

Sam Moyn (Harvard Law School)

Thu, 2017-05-04 16:10
Date and time:  Thu, 25/05/2017 - 16:00 - 17:30 Seminar Special event Research School of Social Sciences Location:  Lecture Theatre 1.02, Sir Roland Wilson Building

Kevin Zollman (Carnegie Mellon): "The Credit Economy and the Economic Rationality of Science"

Thu, 2017-05-04 16:06
Date and time:  Thu, 18/05/2017 - 15:30 - 17:30 Seminar Thursday Seminar School of Philosophy Location:  Coombs Seminar Room A

Theories of scientific rationality typically pertain to belief. This talk argues that we should expand our focus to include not just scientists' beliefs but also their motivations.  An economic model is used to evaluate whether science is best served by scientists motivated only by truth, only by credit, or by both truth and credit.  In many, but not all, situations scientists motivated by both truth and credit should be judged as the most rational scientists.

Alex Miller (Otago): "Rule-Following, Meaning and Primitive Normativity"

Thu, 2017-05-04 16:04
Date and time:  Thu, 11/05/2017 - 15:30 - 17:30 Seminar Thursday Seminar School of Philosophy Location:  Coombs Seminar Room A

In “Inside and Outside Language: Stroud’s Non-Reductionism about Meaning” (2011), “Primitive Normativity and Skepticism about Rules” (2011) and”Meaning, Understanding and Normativity” (2012), Hannah Ginsborg develops what she describes as a “partially reductionist” account of meaning. Ginsborg’s account is intended as a middle-ground alternative to non-reductionism about meaning and the kind of reductive dispositionalism attacked in Kripke’s *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language*.

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Fiona Fidler (UMELB): How reproducible should science be?

Tue, 2017-04-25 17:21
Date and time:  Thu, 27/04/2017 - 15:30 - 17:30 Thursday Seminar School of Philosophy Location:  Coombs Seminar Room A

Less than half of peer-reviewed, published experiments in psychology can be replicated with the same or similar effects[1]. The reproducibility of published biomedical research is even lower, and the cost of irreproducibility in biomedicine has been estimated at $28 billion per year, in the US alone[2]. This is all widely considered undesirable—but how reproducible should science be? This talk is a thinly veiled plea for philosophical help with this question.

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Tom Parr (Essex)

Sat, 2017-04-22 21:42
Date and time:  Mon, 14/08/2017 - 12:30 - 14:00 MSPT seminar School of Philosophy Location:  Coombs Seminar Room A

Preston Greene (NTU Singapore)

Sat, 2017-04-22 19:19
Date and time:  Mon, 07/08/2017 - 12:30 - 14:00 MSPT seminar School of Philosophy Location:  Coombs Seminar Room A

Geoffrey Sayre-McCord (UNC)

Sat, 2017-04-22 19:17
Date and time:  Mon, 31/07/2017 - 12:30 - 14:00 MSPT seminar School of Philosophy Location:  Coombs Seminar Room A

Marc Fleurbaey (Princeton)

Sat, 2017-04-22 19:15
Date and time:  Mon, 24/07/2017 - 12:30 - 14:00 MSPT seminar School of Philosophy Location:  Coombs Seminar Room A

Julia Driver (WUSTL)

Sat, 2017-04-22 19:12
Date and time:  Mon, 17/07/2017 - 12:30 - 14:00 MSPT seminar School of Philosophy Location:  Coombs Seminar Room A

David Sobel (Syracuse)

Sat, 2017-04-22 19:09
Date and time:  Mon, 19/06/2017 - 12:30 - 14:00 MSPT seminar School of Philosophy Location:  Coombs Seminar Room A

Updated: 29 May 2017/ Responsible Officer:  Director, RSSS / Page Contact:  Web Publisher