Frank Cameron Jackson took mathematics and philosophy at the University of Melbourne and a PhD in philosophy at La Trobe University. He taught at Adelaide for a year (1967) before moving to La Trobe and then to a chair at Monash (1978). He joined the ANU in 1986 as Professor of Philosophy and Head of the Philosophy Program, Research School of Social Sciences. At ANU he has served as Director of the Institute of Advanced Studies (1998-2001) and Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Research) (2001). He was appointed as Distinguished Professor at ANU in 2003. He is the Convener of the College of Arts and Social Sciences.
He has held visiting appointments at State University of New York at Buffalo, Victoria University of Wellington, Otago University (as William Evans Visiting Fellow, and as Daniel Taylor Visiting Fellow), Harvard University, Princeton University (as a Senior Humanities Council Fellow), Oxford University (as John Locke Lecturer), the University of Michigan (as James B. and Grace J. Nelson Philosopher in Residence), Cambridge University (as St John's Overseas Visiting Scholar), and the University of Canterbury, New Zealand (as Erskine Visitor). He gave 2003 Patrick Romanell Lecture at the American Philosophical Association. He is a Corresponding Fellow of the British Academy, a Fellow of the Australian Academy of the Humanities and the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia.
In 2006 he will be Tang Chun-I Visiting Professor at The Chinese University of Hong Kong in March and will give the Blackwell-Brown Lectures at Brown University.
His research covers Philosophical Logic, Cognitive Science, Epistemology and Metaphysics, and Meta-Ethics.
Email: Frank.Jackson@anu.edu.au.
Telephone: 02 6125 2340
Fax: 02 6125 0502
Publications
Frank Jackson is the author of
Perception: A Representative
Theory, Cambridge University Press, 1977, reprinted in Gregg Revivals,
1994; Conditionals, Basil Blackwell, 1987; The Philosophy of Mind
and Cognition, Basil Blackwell, 1996 (with David Braddon-Mitchell); From
Metaphysics to Ethics, Oxford University Press, 1997; and Mind, Method, and Conditionals: Selected Essays, Routledge, 1998. He is the editor of Conditionals,
Oxford University Press, 1991; Consciousness, The International Research
Library of Philosophy, Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1998; Lewisian
Themes: the Philosophy of David K. Lewis, Oxford University Press, 2004 (with
Graham Priest); and The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy,
Oxford University Press, 2005 (with Michael Smith).
Frank Jackson's papers cover all the areas listed in his research
interests. They include:
'The Analogical Inference to Other Minds', American
Philosophical Quarterly, 9, 168-176, (April, 1972). (With
A. Hyslop.)
'Grue', Journal of Philosophy,
LXXI, 113-131, (March, 1975). Reprinted in Douglas Stalker (ed), Grue! The New Riddle
of Induction, Open Court, 1994, pp. 79-96.
'The Existence of Mental Objects', American Philosophical
Quarterly, 13, 33-40, (January, 1976). Reprinted in Perceptual Knowledge,
ed. Jonathan Dancy, Oxford University Press, 1988,
pp.113-126. Reprinted in The Nature of Mind, ed. David
M. Rosenthal, Oxford
University Press, 1991,
pp. 385 391.
'A Causal Theory of Counterfactuals', Australasian Journal of
Philosophy, 55, 3-21, (May, 1977).
'On Assertion and Indicative Conditionals', Philosophical
Review, LXXXVIII, 4, 565-589, (October, 1979). Reprinted in Conditionals, ed. F. Jackson, Oxford University
Press, 1991, pp. 111 135.
'Conditionals and Possibilia', Proceedings Aristotelian Society,
LXXXI, 126-137, (1980/81).
'Epiphenomenal Qualia', Philosophical
Quarterly, 32, 127, 127-136, (April, 1982).
'Three Theses About Dispositions', American Philosophical Quarterly, 19, 3, 251-57, (July, 1982). (With E. W. Prior and R. Pargetter.)
'Functionalism and Type-Type Identity Theories', Philosophical
Studies, 42, 209-225, (Summer, 1982). (With R. Pargetter and E.W. Prior.)
'Weakness of Will', Mind, XCIII, 369, 1-18, (January,
1984). Reprinted in the Philosopher's Annual,,
vol. VII, pp.66-84.
'The Easy Examination Paradox', in Studies in Analytical
Philosophy: A Comparative Perspective, ed. J.L. Shaw, Reidel,
1985, 151-159.
'Petitio and the
Purpose of Arguing', Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 65, 1, 26-36,
(January, 1984).
'On the Semantics and Logic of Obligation', Mind, XCIV,
374, 177-196, (April, 1985).
'Internal Conflicts in Desires and Morals', American
Philosophical Quarterly, 22, 2, 105-114, (April, 1985).
'Oughts, Options, and Actualism' Philosophical Review, XCV, 233-255, (April, 1986). (With
R. Pargetter.)
'What Mary didn't Know', Journal of Philosophy, 83, 5,
291-295, (May, 1986).
'Functionalism and Broad Content', Mind, XCVII, 387,
381-400, (July 1988). (With P. Pettit.)
'In Defence of Folk Psychology', Philosophical Studies, 59,
1, 31-54, (May, 1990). (With P. Pettit.)
'Decision-theoretic Consequentialism and
the Nearest and Dearest Objection', Ethics,
101, 3, 461-482, (April 1991).
'Armchair Metaphysics', Philosophy in Mind, ed. John
O'Leary Hawthorne and Michaelis Michael,
Philosophical Studies Series, vol. 60, Kluwer, 1994,
pp. 23-42.
'Minimalism and Truth Aptness',
Mind, 103, 411, (July 1994), pp.287-302. (With Michael
Smith and Graham Oppy.)
'Moral Functionalism and Moral Motivation', Philosophical Quarterly, 45, 178 (January, 1995): 20-40. (With Philip
Pettit.)
'Mental Causation: The State of the Art', Mind, 105, 419
(July 1996), pp. 377-413.
'Naturalism and the Fate of the M-Worlds', Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society, supp. vol. 71 (1997): pp. 269-82
'The Teleological Theory of Content', Australasian Journal of
Philosophy, 75, 4 (Dec. 1997): pp. 474-89. (With David
Braddon-Mitchell.)
'Reference and Description Revisited', Philosophical
Perspectives, vol. 12, Language, Mind, and Ontology, 1998, pp. 201-18.
'A Problem for Expressivism', Analysis, 58, 4 (October 1998): 239-51. (With Philip
Pettit.)
'Inference for Noncognitivists' in Dale
Jamieson, ed., Singer and His Critics, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1999, pp. 18 - 37.
'Non-Cognitivism, Normativity,
Belief', Ratio, 12, 4 (December 1999): 420-35. 0034-0006
'The Divide and Conquer Path to Analytical Functionalism', Philosophical Topics, 26, 1&2 (Spring &
Fall 1999): 71-88. (With David Braddon-Mitchell.)
(Issue eds: Richard Moran,
Jennifer Whiting, and Alan Sidelle)
'All That Can Be at Issue in The
Theory-theory Simulation Debate', Philosophical Papers, XXVIII (1999),
2: 77 - 95.
'Reply to Yablo: What Do We Communicate
When We Use Ethical Terms?', Philosophical Books,
41, 1, (Jan 2000): 24 - 9. ISSN 0031-8051.
'Representation, Scepticism, and the A Priori', New Essays on
the A Priori, eds, Paul Boghossian and Christopher Peacocke,
Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 2000, pp. 320-332.
'Ethical Particularism and Patterns' in Moral Particularism, ed. Brad Hooker and
Margaret Little, Oxford
University Press, 2000, ch. 4, pp. 79 - 99. (With Philip Pettit
and Michael Smith.)
'What is Expressivism?',
review discussion of Simon Blackburn, Ruling Passions, Oxford: Clarendon Press, Philosophical Books,
42, 1 (Jan 2001): 10 - 17.
'Locke-ing onto Content',Naturalism,
Evolution and Mind, Royal Institute of Philosophy conference volume, ed.
Denis Walsh, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 127 - 143.
'How Decision Illuminates Assignments of Moral responsibility', in Intention in Law and Philosophy, eds
Ngaire Naffine, Rosemary J.
Owens, John Williams, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001, pp. 19 - 36.
'Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation', Philosophical
Review, 110, 3 (July 2001): 315 - 60. (With David J.
Chalmers.)
'Language, Thought and the Epistemic Theory of Vagueness', Language and Communication, 22, 3 (2002): 269-279.
'A Pyrrhic Victory For Teleonomy', Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 80,
3 (Sept. 2002): 372-377. (With David Braddon-Mitchell.)
Critical Notice of Timothy Williamson, Knowledge and Its Limits,
Oxford University Press, 2000, Australasian
Journal of Philosophy, 80, 4 (Dec. 2002): 516-521.
'From H2O to Water: the Relevance to A Priori Passage', Real
Metaphysics, papers for D.H. Mellor, ed. Hallvard
Lillehammer and Gonzalo Roderiguez-Pereyra, London: Routledge, 2003, pp. 84-97.
'Locke, Expressivism, Conditionals', Analysis, 63.1 (2003): 86-93. (With Philip Pettit.)
'Cognitivism, A Priori Deduction, and Moore', Ethics,
113, 3 (April 2003): 557-575.
'David Kellogg Lewis: Philosopher and Philosopher of Mind', Mind and Language, 18, 3 (2003): 281-285.
'Mind and Illusion', in Minds and Persons, ed. Anthony O'Hear, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement: 53, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2003, pps 251-71.
'Representation and Narrow Belief', Philosophical Issues,
supplement to Nous, 13 (2003): 99 -112.
'Narrow Content and Representationalism
- or Twin Earth Revisited', 2003 Patrick Romanell
Lecture, Proceedings American Philosophical Association, 77, 2 (Nov.
2003): 55 - 71.
'Ramsey Sentences and Avoiding the Sui Generis', in Ramsey's Legacy, ed. Hallvard Lillehammer, D. H. Mellor, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005, pp. 123 - 136.
'What Are Cognitivists Doing When They
Do Normative Ethics?', Normativity, Philosophical Issues,
supplement to Noûs,15 (2005):
94-106.
'What are Proper Names For?', in Experience and Analysis,
Proc. 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium, 2004, ed. Johann C. Marek and Maria E. Reicher, hpt-öbv Vienna, 2005, pp. 257-269.
'Consciousness', The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy,
ed. Frank Jackson and Michael Smith, Oxford University Press, 2005, pp.
310-333.
