%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%                                                                     %
%              Scientific Word   Wrap/Unwrap  Version 2.5             %
%              Scientific Word   Wrap/Unwrap  Version 3.0             %
%                                                                     %
% If you are separating the files in this message by hand, you will   %
% need to identify the file type and place it in the appropriate      %
% directory.  The possible types are: Document, DocAssoc, Other,      %
% Macro, Style, Graphic, PastedPict, and PlotPict. Extract files      %
% tagged as Document, DocAssoc, or Other into your TeX source file    %
% directory.  Macro files go into your TeX macros directory. Style    %
% files are used by Scientific Word and do not need to be extracted.  %
% Graphic, PastedPict, and PlotPict files should be placed in a       %
% graphics directory.                                                 %
%                                                                     %
% Graphic files need to be converted from the text format (this is    %
% done for e-mail compatability) to the original 8-bit binary format. %
%                                                                     %
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%                                                                     %
% Files included:                                                     %
%                                                                     %
% "/document/exchnew.tex", Document, 25719, 4/4/2003, 5:24:30, ""     %
% "/document/FJ8NUM04.wmf", PastePict, 24078, 3/5/2003, 0:41:06, ""   %
%                                                                     %
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% Start /document/exchnew.tex %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%


\documentclass[12pt,thmsa]{article}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
\usepackage{sw20jar2}
\usepackage{doublespace}

%TCIDATA{TCIstyle=Article/art4.lat,jar2,sw20jart}

%TCIDATA{OutputFilter=LATEX.DLL}
%TCIDATA{Version=4.00.0.2312}
%TCIDATA{LastRevised=Friday, April 04, 2003 15:24:28}
%TCIDATA{<META NAME="GraphicsSave" CONTENT="32">}
%TCIDATA{Language=American English}

\input{tcilatex}
\input tcilatex

\begin{document}

\title{Irreversible investments with private information and
complementarities.}
\date{}
\author{}
\maketitle

\begin{abstract}
Consider the case that investments are irreversible, and that different
investors have different private information about the profitability of
investments. Then, the proportion of investors that actually invests is
smaller when there are complementarities and further decreases with the
number of investors. In most circumstances, higher volatility decreases the
proportion of investors that actually invest.

Keywords: uncertainty, coordination, complementarities, information.

YEL-codes: C72, D82, E22, F21.
\end{abstract}

\section{Introduction}

Irreversible investments under uncertainty can explain a wide range of
phenomena. Dixit and Pindyck (1998) showed that the irreversibility of
investments lead investors to demand a very high expected return on their
investments before they make the irreversible investments. When the
investments are also complementary, the hold-up problem may appear (e.g.
De-Fraja, 1999 and Koss and Eaton, 1997). Hold-up problems have been
identified in the labour market (e.g. Picot and Schlicht (eds.), 1997), in
markets for environmental regulation (e.g. Gersbach and Glazer, 1999), and
also for foreign direct investments and investments during agricultural
transitions (Gow and Swinnen, 1998). In this paper I look at the hold-up
problem when agents have private information about the future benefits of
investments. This for instance arises when foreign investors who invest in
complementary activities have private expectations about future exchange
rates, or when workers and employees who both have to make match-specific
investments have private information about future market circumstances,
future personal circumstances or planned government interventions. When an
employee for instance considers investing in match-specific capital, he is
likely to have private information about his future health. The employer
considering match-specific investments with that employee is likely to have
private information about the value of future production. Similarly,
different investors in an industry are likely to have some private
information about the future developments in their particular sub-sector.
These are examples of private information about the future profits of all
investors in the complementary investments. The private information is
obtainable to other agents in principle, but at a cost. Considering the role
of private information in these circumstances seems worthwhile therefore.

In a simple model I consider the case that individuals have private
knowledge about the profitability of all investments in a complementary
activity. The main result is that complementarities increase the probability
that a minimal proportion of the investors will believe the investment to be
unprofitable, making the investment unprofitable for all. Hence greater
uncertainty coupled with private information and complementarities yields a
hold-up problem, which does not arise without private information.

In the second section, the model is presented and some links are made to the
literature on complementarities. The final section concludes.

\section{The model}

\subsection{The setting}

Consider the decision of an agent when he has to make known costs now and
when his future revenues are uncertain. More precisely, assume that an
irreversible investment would cost Q now and would yield future revenues of Q%
$\varepsilon .$ Several interpretations of this set-up arise. Q could stand
for the cost of physical capital or labour costs in the case that the
investments are interpreted as being made by firms, in which case $%
\varepsilon $ could represent future prices or exchange rates when it
concerns investments abroad. When the agent is a worker who has the option
of investing in match-specific capital, Q could be interpreted as the costs
of this capital, whereas $\varepsilon $ would then be a function of the
probability that the match will last and would also depend on the future
prices of the activities of the worker in case a worker obtains part of this
future production. Another example would be when the agent is a firm who
considers following environmental regulation, where Q would represent the
costs of following the regulation and $\varepsilon $ would represent an
unknown benefit from an improved future environment or an unknown
compensation by the authorities.

The actual profit of an agent i in case he invests equals $\pi
_{i}=Q(\varepsilon -1).$ Suppose that the uncertain factor $\varepsilon $ is
affected by n shocks, which are each i.i.d.:

\begin{equation}
\varepsilon =\gamma +\sum_{j=1}^{n}u_{j}
\end{equation}

whereby $\gamma $ is a constant and the cumulative distribution of $u_{j}$
is denoted by G$(u_{j};\mu ,\frac{1}{n}\sigma ^{2})$ which is defined,
continuous and differentiable for all $u_{j}\geq 0.$ There holds that E[$%
u_{j}$]=$\mu =0$, E[($u_{j}-\mu )^{2}$]=$\frac{1}{n}\sigma ^{2},$ $\frac{%
dG(u_{j};\mu ,\frac{1}{n}\sigma ^{2})}{d(\frac{1}{n}\sigma ^{2})}\geq 0$ iff 
$u_{j}<\mu $ and $0\geq \frac{dG(u_{j};\mu ,\frac{1}{n}\sigma ^{2})}{d(\frac{%
1}{n}\sigma ^{2})}$ iff $u_{j}>\mu .$ These last assumptions imply that
there is less probability mass near $\mu $ when $\sigma ^{2}$ increases (the
more volatility, the less small shocks arise). It also implies that G must
be unimodal with its median and mean coinciding. These assumptions are met
by a wide range of distributions, including the normal distribution and the
uniform distribution. For an individual with no information on any of these
shocks, there holds E[$\varepsilon $]=$\gamma ,$ and Var[$\varepsilon $]=$%
\sigma ^{2}.$

Now suppose that investor i has information on one of the random shocks
before he decides to invest, i.e., investor i knows the realization of one
of the u$_{j}$'s which is denoted by u$_{i}$. The other random shocks are
revealed after the decision to invest. Hence the investor i knows the
realization of u$_{i}$ but only knows the distribution of other shocks,
which means that for investor i there holds that E[$\varepsilon _{i}$]=$%
\gamma +u_{i}$ and Var[$\varepsilon _{i}$]$=(1-\frac{1}{n})\sigma ^{2}$. We
can interpret $\frac{1}{n}$ as a measure of the amount of information held
by an investor: the greater the amount of information, the less uncertain
the investor is about future profits. This private information may either be
information that is available publicly, but which would require a costly
search effort of other investors to find, or information that is genuinely
not available to others, such as inside information about intended policies
of governments or intended actions by other major organizations (union,
institutional investors, etc.). In case the investor is an individual, it
could also contain private information about personal circumstances, for
instance the state of health of an individual employee.

In the absence of investment complementarities, the ex-ante probability that
a risk-neutral investor i invests, which is denoted by $P_{i}$, equals the
probability that his expected profits are positive\footnote{$P_{i}$ denotes
the ex ante probability that investor i will invest; the investor himself
knows with certainty, knowing the realisation of u$_{i},$ whether he will
invest. $P_{i}$ can in this case be interpreted as the proportion of
potential investors that actually invests.}, which is

\begin{eqnarray}
P_{i} &=&\Pr [E[Q(\varepsilon _{i}-1)]>0] \\
&=&\Pr [Q(\gamma +u_{i}-1))>0]  \nonumber \\
&=&\Pr [u_{i}>1-\gamma ]  \nonumber \\
&=&\bar{G}(1-\gamma ;0,\frac{1}{n}\sigma ^{2})
\end{eqnarray}

with E the expectations operator and where Pr denotes probability.\ If the
investment is expected to be profitable in the absence of information (i.e., 
$\gamma >1),$ then $P_{i}$ decreases with the volatility of $\varepsilon $ (=%
$\sigma ^{2}),$ and decreases in the amount of private information an
investor i has (=$\frac{1}{n}$). This result is not new: in any investment
model, if private information suggests an investment is unprofitable, an
investor will not invest.

\subsection{Extreme complementarities}

Suppose now that there are k potential investors and that the pay-offs to
the investments of the k investors are complementary and that the investors
have to decide simultaneously whether to invest in a particular industry or
not. For simplicity, the complementarities between the investments are
extreme such that revenues are zero if one or more investors have not
invested. Although there is quite some evidence of for the existence of
complementarities (e.g. Bartelsman et al., 1994, Cooper and John, 1988,
Cooper and Haltiwanger, 1996, and Miyagawa, 1993), this assumption is
somewhat extreme. In section 2.3, it is therefore shown that a weaker form
of complementarity leads to qualitatively similar results.

The complementarities mean that the expected profit of actually investing by
investor i can be written as:

\begin{equation}
\hat{\pi}_{i}=Q(P_{\neq i}\hat{\varepsilon}_{i}-1)
\end{equation}

whereby $\hat{\varepsilon}_{i}$ denotes the expectation of i as to $%
\varepsilon $ and $P_{\neq i}$ denotes the ex ante probability, as evaluated
by i, that all the investors apart from i will invest. For simplicity only,
it is assumed that each investor has a different piece of information, i.e.
no two potential investors know the realization of the same u$_{j}$.%
\footnote{%
Investors who have the same information as another investor will behave
identically in the equilibria we look at. Hence we need only examine the k
investors with different pieces of information.}

The probability that the expected profit of investor i is positive equals

\begin{eqnarray}
P_{i} &=&\Pr (\hat{\pi}_{i}>0) \\
&=&\Pr [Q(P_{\neq i}(\gamma +u_{i})-1)>0]  \nonumber \\
&=&\bar{G}(\frac{1}{P_{\neq i}}-\gamma ;0,\frac{1}{n}\sigma ^{2})
\end{eqnarray}

Now, if all agents share the same expectations of the investment behaviour
of all other agents, the ex ante probability that any investor invests
equals $P_{i}$. Furthermore, because each investor has a separate piece of
information, the ex ante probability that all other investors apart from i
invests is equal to$\ (P_{i})^{k-1}=P_{\neq i}.$ We can then solve for $%
P_{i} $ as a nested function of $P_{i}$:

\begin{equation}
P_{i}=\bar{G}(\frac{1}{(P_{i})^{k-1}}-\gamma ;0,\frac{1}{n}\sigma
^{2})=f(P_{i})  \label{e1}
\end{equation}

A solution to this equation is a Nash equilibrium in the sense that the
belief of each investor i about the ex ante probability that any other
investor will invest, is equal to the ex ante probability that investor i
will invest. One can also view this equilibrium in terms of reservation
strategies: an individual will invest only if $u_{i}$ is greater than $\frac{%
1}{(P_{i})^{k-1}}-\gamma $. If we denote this value as the reservation value 
$r_{i}$ of individual i and do the same for all others, $P_{\neq i}$ equals $%
\Pr [u_{1}>r_{1},..,u_{i-1}>r_{i-1},u_{i+1}>r_{i+1},..u_{k}>r_{k}]$. If all
individuals have correct beliefs about the reservation strategies of all
others, they must have the same reservation values in this case. Solving for
the common reservation value is then equivalent to solving for $P_{i}$. The
latter is the route expanded upon here.

In general, the solution equation is not analytically tractable for every
conceivable distribution function G, but its characteristics are tractable.

First, one equilibrium that always exists is $P_{i}=0$ because $f(0)=\bar{G}%
(\infty )=0.$ If each investor believes no-one else will invest, he will
with certainty also not invest. We also know that 1$\geq $f(1). The maximum
number of equilibria possible then equals 1+2s, where s is the number of
maxima of $\frac{d\bar{G}(\frac{1}{(P_{i})^{k-1}}-\gamma ;0,\frac{1}{n}%
\sigma ^{2})}{dP_{i}}.$ If $\frac{d\bar{G}(\frac{1}{(P_{i})^{k-1}}-\gamma ;0,%
\frac{1}{n}\sigma ^{2})}{dP_{i}}$ is unimodal (as with the normal
distribution), the number of equilibria is at least one and at most three.
Hence, as in Cooper and John (1988), it is possible to get multiple
investment equilibria due to the coordination problem between investors in
the presence of complementarities.

Another characteristic of (2.7) is that any solution corresponds to a $\bar{G%
}(1-\gamma )\geq P_{i}.$ This inequality is strict if the marginal
distribution $g(.)$ is positive and continuous at ($1-\gamma $). Therefore,
the probability that investments are expected to be profitable will
generally be lower with complementarities than in the absence of
complementarities and will never be higher. Also, when k goes to infinity,
the only remaining solution is $P_{i}=0$. Therefore, even if the effect of
volatility on investment is negligible for the expected profits of one
investor in the non-complementary case as he may have only very little
private information, the effect becomes non-negligible when the investments
of many investors are complementary.

As to the other characteristics of the equilibrium: by taking total
derivatives, we obtain

\begin{eqnarray*}
\frac{dP_{i}}{d\gamma } &=&\frac{\frac{\partial f(P_{i})}{\partial \gamma }}{%
1-\frac{\partial f(P_{i})}{\partial P_{i}}}=\frac{g(\frac{1}{(P_{i})^{k-1}}%
-\gamma ;0,\frac{1}{n}\sigma ^{2})}{c} \\
\frac{dP_{i}}{dk} &=&\frac{\frac{\ln P_{i}}{(P_{i})^{k-1}}g(\frac{1}{%
(P_{i})^{k-1}}-\gamma ;0,\frac{1}{n}\sigma ^{2})}{c} \\
\frac{dP_{i}}{d\sigma ^{2}} &=&\frac{\frac{\partial \bar{G}(\frac{1}{%
(P_{i})^{k-1}}-\gamma ;0,\frac{1}{n}\sigma ^{2})}{\partial (\sigma ^{2})}}{c}
\end{eqnarray*}

where $c=1-\frac{\partial f(P_{i})}{\partial P_{i}}=1-\frac{(k-1)}{%
(P_{i})^{k}}g(\frac{1}{(P_{i})^{k-1}}-\gamma ;0,(1-\frac{1}{n})\sigma ^{2}).$
If 0$\geq c$, the equilibrium is unstable. Looking only at the stable
equilibria$,$ there holds that $\frac{dP_{i}}{d\gamma }\geq 0$ and $0\geq 
\frac{dP_{i}}{dk}.$ These inequalities are strict for distributions with
positive marginal distributions for the whole real axis. Hence, the
probability of investments will generally increase with $\gamma $ and
decrease with the number of investors. Also, $0\geq \frac{dP_{i}}{d\sigma
^{2}}$ iff $\gamma >\frac{1}{(P_{i})^{k-1}}.$ Hence, when investments are
expected to be unprofitable in the absence of information ($\gamma <1$),
increasing volatility makes these investments more likely because the
probability that all investors simultaneously have very positive private
information increases. If investments are expected to be very profitable
however, these investments are going to be less likely to occur when there
is private information and volatility increases.

As an example of the possibilities, take G(.) to be a normal distribution
and consider the four examples in Figure 1 where $P_{i}$ is plotted against
f($P_{i}$) for various parameter values.\ Each intersection point is an
equilibrium, but only the intersections at which $\frac{\partial f(P_{i})}{%
\partial P_{i}}<1$ are stable.

\FRAME{ftbpFU}{311.6875pt}{192.25pt}{0pt}{\Qcb{Parameter values for F1:
n=10, k=2, $\protect\gamma =4,\protect\sigma ^{2}=3.$ F2: n=10, k=2, $%
\protect\gamma =4,\protect\sigma ^{2}=40.$ F3: n=10, k=3, $\protect\gamma =4,%
\protect\sigma ^{2}=40.$ F4: n=10, k=3, $\protect\gamma =2,\protect\sigma %
^{2}=40.$ }}{}{Figure }{\special{language "Scientific Word";type
"GRAPHIC";maintain-aspect-ratio TRUE;display "USEDEF";valid_file "T";width
311.6875pt;height 192.25pt;depth 0pt;original-width 735.5pt;original-height
451.9375pt;cropleft "0";croptop "1";cropright "1";cropbottom
"0";tempfilename 'FJ8NUM04.wmf';tempfile-properties "XPR";}}

In the figure, each function has a stable intersection point at P$_{i}=0.$
F1, with very high $\gamma ,$ has two more intersection points: one very
near P$_{i}=1$ and one where P$_{i}\approx 0.228.$ This last one is
unstable. For F2, with a higher volatility (=$\sigma ^{2}$), we also have
three intersection points, and we can see that the highest intersection
point is somewhat lower due to the increased volatility. For F3, where k is
higher relative to F2, we still have three intersection points, but the
highest intersection point is somewhat lower, due to the decreased $\gamma .$
For F4, profitability is lower than for F3, which means P4 has only one
equilibrium at P$_{i}=0.$

We may note that if no investor has any private information, there is only
one Nash-equilibrium if $\gamma <1,$ which is that no-one invests. If iff $%
\gamma >1$ and no-one has any information, there are two Nash-equilibria:
one where no-one invests and one in which each investor will$,$ in which
case there is no hold-up problem, whatever the volatility of future profits.

\subsection{generalized complementarities}

So far, the complementarities were assumed to be extreme in the sense that
the irreversible investments were a total write-off when one of the k
investors did not invest. It seems likely however that when there are many
investors, it is not so much important that every investor invests, but that
a sizeable proportion invests. To incorporate this possibility, define
future revenues as:

\[
Q\epsilon \ast f(\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{k}y_{i}}{k}) 
\]

where $y_{i}=1$ iff investor i invests and $y_{i}=0$ otherwise; As a minimum
set of assumptions on the function f(.), it is assumed that $f(1)=1,$ $%
fs(0)=0,$ and $\frac{\partial fs}{\partial k}>0.$ Hence revenues for all
increase when a higher proportion of potential investors invests. The amount
of future revenue of investor i then equals $y_{i}Q\epsilon f(\frac{\sum y}{k%
})$. The probability that m out of k investors will actually invest equals ($%
P_{i})^{m}(1-P_{i})^{k-m}\binom{k}{m}.$ What is important for the individual
investor is the expected amount of sales should he himself decide to invest.
This equals $Q\epsilon \overline{f}_{i}$=$Q\epsilon \sum_{m=0}^{m=k-1}\binom{%
k-1}{m}(P_{i})^{m}(1-P_{i})^{k-m-1}f(\frac{1+m}{k})$. There holds that $%
\frac{\partial \overline{f}_{i}}{\partial P_{i}}\geq 0,$ and $0\geq \frac{%
\partial \overline{f}_{i}}{\partial k}$. The intuition behind this last
result is that the importance of the information the investor has about his
own decision to produce decreases with greater $k$: when calculating the
profits he would make if he invests, investor i knows with certainty that a
proportion of the investors will invest if he invests (namely himself). This
proportion decreases with $k$. Hence the expected revenues of an investor
are decreasing in k for any given $P_{i}<1$.

For $P_{i}$ there now holds: 
\begin{eqnarray*}
P_{i} &=&pr(\hat{\pi}_{i}>0) \\
&=&pr[Q(\overline{f}_{i}(\gamma +u_{i})-1)>0] \\
&=&\bar{G}(\frac{1}{\sum_{m=0}^{m=k-1}\binom{k-1}{m}%
(P_{i})^{m}(1-P_{i})^{k-m-1}f(\frac{1+m}{k})}-\gamma ;0,\frac{1}{n}\sigma
^{2})
\end{eqnarray*}

for which we can see again that $P_{i}<\bar{G}(1-\gamma ),$ implying that
the presence of complementarities reduces the probability of investment.
Also, $0\geq \frac{dP_{i}}{d\gamma }$ and $0\geq \frac{dP_{i}}{dk}$ for
stable equilibria$,$ as in the case with extreme complementarities$.$ As to
the effect of volatility, we can again see that if $\gamma >\frac{1}{%
\overline{f}_{i}}$, then $\frac{dP_{i}}{d\sigma ^{2}}<0.$ The proportion of
potential investors that hence invests (=$P_{i}$) in projects which are
otherwise quite profitable, decreases with the amount of information that
each investor has and decreases with volatility. When the investment is
otherwise expected to be unprofitable, it is possible that increasing
volatility actually increases the probability of investment (from
exceedingly unlikely to very unlikely). The qualitative results are
therefore the same as in the case of extreme complementarities.

\subsection{Supporting evidence}

Hold-up problems in the labour market in the presence of complementarities
have been well-documented and have lead to a wide variety of models (see
e.g. the survey in Teulings and Hartog, 1997).

For foreign investments, there is some useful evidence on the relation
between investments and volatility: when an investor has to make fixed costs
in one currency and obtains sales in another currency, the problem described
above may become relevant when different investors in complementary
activities have private expectations about exchange rates. The empirical
studies of Bell and Campa (1997), Goldberg and Kolstad (1995) and Campa
(1993) have shown that bilateral investments into the countries they
investigated declined with exchange rate volatility, especially when
investments were irreversible. In the model in this paper, this would also
happen for investments with a high $\gamma $. There are alternative
explanations of these finding though, such as risk-aversion (Goldberg and
Kolstad, 1995) or heterogeneity in time-preferences (Neumann, 1995). Indeed,
if the efficient market hypothesis is true, investors could not have any
information about future exchange rates not already discounted in current
exchange rates. The efficient market hypothesis directly contradicts
Schumpeter's perception of markets as ways to continuously find new
information though. Even so, the applicability of the model to foreign
investments relies on a violation of the efficient market hypothesis.

\section{Conclusions}

This paper makes a single simple point. When the profits of an investment
are uncertain and different investors have private information on the future
profitability of the investment, the number of investors will decline if
these investments are complementary. If investments are otherwise expected
to be quite profitable, higher volatility of future revenues increases the
fraction of potential investors that has private information making them
believe that an investment is unprofitable. Hence, uncertainty with private
information in the case of complementary investments leads to a hold-up
problem greater than without private information, even in the absence of
risk-aversion.\newline
\newline

\textbf{Literature}

\begin{enumerate}
\item Bartelsman, E., Cabballero, R., and R. Lyons (1994), ''Customer- and
supplier-driven externalities'', \textit{American Economic Review}, 84(4),
pp. 1075-84.

\item Bell, G.K., Campa, J.M. (1997), ''Irreversible Investments and
Volatile Markets: A Study of the Chemical Processing Industry'', \textit{%
Review of Economics and Statistics,} 79(1), pp. 79-87.

\item Campa, J.M. (1993), ''Entry by Foreign Firms in the United States
under Exchange Rate Uncertainty '', \textit{Review of Economics and
Statistics}, 75(4), pp. 614-22..

\item Cooper, R.W., and J. Haltiwanger (1996), ''Evidence on macro-economic
complementarities'', \textit{Review of Economics and Statistics}, 78(1), pp.
78-93.

\item Cooper, R.W., and A. John (1988), ''Coordinating coordination failures
in Keynesian models'', \textit{Quarterly Journal of Economics}, 103, pp.
441-463.

\item De-Fraja, G. (1999), `After you sir. Hold-up, direct externalities,
and sequential investment', \textit{Games and Economic Behaviour}, 26(1),
pp. 22-39.

\item Dixit, A.K., and Pindyck, R.S. (1998), ''Expandibility, reversibility
and optimal capacity choice'', \textit{NBER Working Papers 6373}, Cambridge,
MA.

\item Gersbach, H., Glazer, A. (1999), `Markets and regulatory hold-up
problems', \textit{Journal of Environmental Economics and Management},
37(2), pp. 151-64.

\item Goldberg, L.S., and C.D. Kolstad (1995), ''Foreign Direct Investment,
Exchange Rate Variability and Demand Uncertainty'', \textit{International
Economic Review}, 36(4), pp. 855-73.

\item Gow, H.R., Swinnen, J.F.M. (1998), `Up- and downstream restructuring,
foreign direct investment, and hold-up problems in agricultural transition', 
\textit{European Review of Agricultural Economics}, 25(3), pp. 331-50.

\item Koss, P.A., Eaton, B.C. (1997), `Co-specific investments, hold-up and
self-enforcing contracts', \textit{Journal of Economic Behaviour and
Organisation}, 32(3), pp. 457-470.

\item Miyagawa, T.(1993), ''Complementarities and cumulative processes in
models of monopolistic competition'', \textit{Journal of Economic Literature}%
, 33(2), pp. 701-729.

\item Neumann, M. (1995), ''Real Effects of Exchange Rate Volatility'', 
\textit{Journal of International Money and Finance}, 14(3), pp. 417-26.

\item Picot, A., Schlicht, E. (eds, 1997), \textit{Firms, markets, and
contracts: contributions to neoinstitutional economics}, Contributions to
economics, Heidelberg: Physica.

\item Teulings, C., Hartog, J., (1997), \textit{Corporatism or competition:
An international comparison of labour market structures and their impact on
wage formation}, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
\end{enumerate}

\end{document}

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% End /document/exchnew.tex %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% Start /document/FJ8NUM04.wmf %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

WwlqZB@@@@@@@dOYKxC{I@@@@@@dpH@@I@@@CpoK@@PC@dD@@@@@@T@@@@PBB@@@@@PA@@@@AHp
O@D@@@@PP@M@@A@@@@BD`@@T@@@@@CB`jCZ_q@@@@@^@@A@@@@gDpO@@@@`G@P@@@@pIA|
E@@@@l`@@@@@@L@@@@`G@T@@@@P@B|CPA@@@@IH@@@@@@P@@@@lo@m~O@@@@@@@@dA@@@@
@@@@@@@AIWZaqF@ZE@A@@@@mD@@@@A@@@p~Bpy@@@@@@@@|J@@@@@@@@@@@Dd\iEF[@tZ`D@@@
@tR@A@@A@@@@mDP@@P@@@@PKAD@@P@@@@lo@m~O@@@@@@@@oB@@@@@@@@@@@AIWZaqF@VF@A@@@
@mD`@@P@@@@PKAH@@D@@@@tR@B@@A@@@@mD`@@P@@@@PKAH@@P@@@@lo@P@pA@@@@@@@oB@@@@@
P@BH`HSew\tUV[@xFA@@@@mDp@@P@@@@pIA|C@@@@xA@D@@@@tR@B@PA@@@@AHpO@E@@@@
d`@@@@@@\@@@@`ED`jCZ_A@@@@@D@@@@tR@C@@A@@@@gDpO@@@@`G@P@@@@PKAH@@E@@@@D`@
@T@@@@PBB@@@@@pA@@@@VP@jNh}E@@@@@\@@@@@B@@@@CLp@@@@D@@@@tR@D@PB@@@@zKP
A@@@@@@@@@@@@b@@A@@@@mDPA@P@@@@@AAt@@D@@@@HP@B@`C@@@@dLPA@HW@FH`LWX`@r\ayLH
W@fs`\AX`@I@@@@ho@@@@@@@@@@@@@@HB@D@@@@tR@F@@A@@@@pGPA@d@@@@`~B@@@@@@@@@@@@
@`H@P@@@@PKAT@@G@@@@po@@@pO@@@@A@@@@mDpA@P@@@@PKAL@@D@@@@\R@@@@@@^@@A
@@@@mD`@@P@@@@PKAP@@D@@@@tR@F@PA@@@@AHpO@E@@@@d`@@@@@@\@@@@`EDhNCr\a@BHW
@E@@@@Pa@FH`\AP@@@@@AAt@@D@@@@HP@A@PA@@@@SH`ABHsED@@@@tR@E@@A@@@@mDpA@P@@@@
PKAL@@D@@@@\R@@@@@@^@@A@@@@mD`@@P@@@@PKAP@@D@@@@tR@F@PA@@@@AHpO@E@@@@
d`@@@@@@\@@@@`ED`jCZ_A@@@@@I@@@@ho@@@@B@@@@@BH`@HB@D@@@@tR@H@@A@@@@pG`A@T@@
@@@EBX`@rE@A@@@@DDPC@P@@@@`@AD@@E@@@@La@FH`LWT@@@@pDBXNCr\QA@@@@SH`yLHW@E@@
@@La@FH`\Ad@@@@`~B@@@@@@@@@@@@@`H@P@@@@PKAX@@D@@@@@_@H@PA@@@@TH`ABHW@E@@@@L
a@fs`\AP@@@@PKA@@@E@@@@Pa@fsPVAT@@@@pDBXNCrEPA@@@@TH`ABdU@E@@@@La@FH`\AT@@@
@@EBXNCrEPA@@@@SH`yLHsEE@@@@Pa@s`\AT@@@@pDBXNCrEPA@@@@THpL|y@E@@@@La@fspg
CT@@@@@EB|OCLWPA@@@@SH`yLp\AE@@@@Pa@s@~GT@@@@pDBXNCx_PA@@@@THpLTbBE@@@@La
@fsPIJT@@@@@EB|OCRqPA@@@@SH`yLHECE@@@@Pa@sp_NT@@@@pDBXNCyPA@@@@THpLpJDE@
@@@La@fs@kPT@@@@@EB|OCXKQA@@@@SH`yL`mDE@@@@Pa@sPAUT@@@@pDBXNCETQA@@@@THpL
HsEE@@@@La@fs`LWP@@@@PKAT@@D@@@@tR@G@@A@@@@mDp@@P@@@@pIA|C@@@@xA@D@@@@tR@
@@@A@@@@mD@A@P@@@@PKAX@@E@@@@D`@@T@@@@PBB@@@@@pA@@@@VPpaNd{Ea@PH@P@@@@P
KAT@@D@@@@tR@G@@A@@@@mDp@@P@@@@pIA|C@@@@xA@D@@@@tR@@@@A@@@@mD@A@P@@@@PKAX
@@E@@@@D`@@T@@@@PBB@@@@@pA@@@@VP`}LLtEyGPYAP@@@@PKAT@@D@@@@tR@G@@A@@@@m
Dp@@P@@@@pIA|C@@@@xA@D@@@@tR@@@@A@@@@mD@A@P@@@@PKAX@@E@@@@D`@@T@@@@PB
B@@@@@pA@@@@VPp|L@tEyGPYA\@@@@@BD@@@@@@@`suD@@@@tR@H@PB@@@@zK@@@`A@@@@@@@H
@b@@A@@@@mDPB@P@@@@@|AX@@D@@@@PP@M@@A@@@@BDP@@`@@@@PICH@@NF`yLhZ@fs@B@@@@eL
`@@hZ@fs`qAXNCH@@@@Tr@B@`qAXNCaG`yL`@@@@PICH@@aG`yLt_@fs@B@@@@eL`@@t_@fsPFB
XNCH@@@@Tr@B@PFBXNCuH`yL`@@@@PICH@@uH`yLDe@fs@B@@@@eL`@@De@fsP[BXNCH@@@@Tr@
B@P[BXNCHJ`yL`@@@@PICH@@HJ`yLPj@fs@B@@@@eL`@@Pj@fs@pBXNCH@@@@Tr@B@@pBXNC\K`
yL`@@@@PICH@@\K`yL`o@fs@B@@@@eL`@@`o@fs@ECXNCH@@@@Tr@B@@ECXNCoL`yL`@@@@PICH
@@oL`yLlt@fs@B@@@@eL`@@lt@fspYCXNCH@@@@Tr@B@pYCXNCCN`yL`@@@@PICH@@CN`yL|y@f
s@B@@@@eL`@@|y@fspnCXNCH@@@@Tr@B@pnCXNCVO`yL`@@@@PICH@@VO`yLH@fs@B@@@@eL`@
@H@fs`CDXNCH@@@@Tr@B@`CDXNCjP`yL`@@@@PICH@@jP`yLXDAfs@B@@@@eL`@@XDAfs`XDXN
CH@@@@Tr@B@`XDXNC~Q`yL`@@@@PICH@@~Q`yLdIAfs@B@@@@eL`@@dIAfsPmDXNCH@@@@Tr@B@
PmDXNCQS`yL`@@@@PICH@@QS`yLtNAfs@B@@@@eL`@@tNAfsPBEXNCH@@@@Tr@B@PBEXNCeTPyL
h@@@@PICL@@eTPyLHSAes@PEPNCJ@@@@Tr@C@@PEPNCNU`xLpUA`s`B@@@@eLp@@pUA`s`ZEtMC
xU@vLp@@@@PICP@@xU@vLXXARsPcExLCTVPrLx@@@@PICT@@TVPrLlYADs`hExKCiVpmL@[Aor`
C@@@@eLPA@@[AorpmEXJC~VPgLT\ASr@sE\HCN@@@@Tr@E@@sE\HCSW`^Ld]Amq@xExECgW`SLx
@@@@PICT@@gW`SLx^A}pP}EhBC|W`ELL`AAp`C@@@@eLPA@L`AAp`BFl~BQXptK`aAznpGF@zBN
@@@@Tr@E@pGF@zBfX@aKtbAhm@MFdtB{X`JKx@@@@PICT@@{X`JKHdAIlPRF\nBPYPqJ\eAaj`C
@@@@eLPA@\eAaj`WFtgBeYpUJpfArhp\Fl`BL@@@@Tr@D@p\Fl`BzY@yI@hA|f`cFhVBJ@@@@Tr
@C@`cFhVB\ZpEIhjACc`B@@@@eLp@@hjACc@nF|FBF[pFHh@@@@PICL@@F[pFHPmAH_`xFXwAJ@
@@@Tr@C@`xFXwAp[`IGxoAX[@C@@@@eL@A@xoAX[@CGphAS\`YFhqABY@C@@@@eL@A@hqABYPHG
xaAh\@EXsAxV@C@@@@eL@A@XsAxVpPG\WAJ]@VEDuAyT`C@@@@eLPA@DuAyT@VGlQA_]`DXvA
bSP[G\LAN@@@@Tr@E@P[G\LAt]PkDlwASR``GhGAI^`XDp@@@@PICP@@I^`XD@yAKQpeGPCAe^P
BDh@@@@PICL@@e^PBDL{AaOPpGl{@J@@@@Tr@C@PpGl{@O_@fCt}AwM`B@@@@eLp@@t}AwM`zGd
u@x_POCh@@@@PICL@@x_POCX@BdL@EHpp@J@@@@Tr@C@@EHpp@b``}B@CBaK`B@@@@eLp@@@CBa
K`OHxl@LaPoBh@@@@PICL@@LaPoBhEBmJ@ZH|i@J@@@@Tr@C@@ZH|i@va`dBPHBFJ`B@@@@eLp@
@PHBFJPdHlg@_bP\B`@@@@PICH@@_bP\BlKB_I@B@@@@eL`@@lKB_IpuH@e@J@@@@Tr@C@puH@e
@ec`RBLOBDI`B@@@@eLp@@LOBDIP@Ixc@OdPNBh@@@@PICL@@OdPNBtQBuHpJIDc@H@@@@Tr@B@
pJIDc@Fe`JB`@@@@PICH@@Fe`JBHVBdH@B@@@@eL`@@HVBdH`_I|a@H@@@@Tr@B@`_I|a@ZfpFB
h@@@@PICL@@ZfpFB`ZBYH`mI\a@J@@@@Tr@C@`mI\a@Dg`EBH]BUH`B@@@@eLp@@H]BUH@xILa@
ng`DB`@@@@PICH@@ng`DBd`BPH@B@@@@eL`@@d`BPHPIJ|`@H@@@@Tr@B@PIJ|`@AiPCB`@@@@P
ICH@@AiPCBteBLH@B@@@@eL`@@teBLHP^Jl`@H@@@@Tr@B@P^Jl`@Uj`BB`@@@@PICH@@Uj`BB@
kBJH`B@@@@eLp@@@kBJH`oJd`@LkPBB`@@@@PICH@@LkPBB`nBIH`B@@@@eLp@@`nBIH`}J``@D
l@BB`@@@@PICH@@Dl@BB@rBHH@B@@@@eL`@@@rBHH@OK``@J@@@@Tr@C@@OK``@ImpAB\uBGH@B
@@@@eL`@@\uBGHp\K\`@H@@@@Tr@B@p\K\`@OnpAB`@@@@PICH@@OnpABlzBGH@B@@@@eL`@@lz
BGHpqK\`@H@@@@Tr@B@pqK\`@copAB`@@@@PICH@@copABxBGH`B@@@@eLp@@xBGH@CLX`@Zp
`AB`@@@@PICH@@Zp`ABXCCFH@B@@@@eL`@@XCCFH`TLX`@H@@@@Tr@B@`TLX`@nq`AB`@@@@PIC
H@@nq`ABhHCFH@B@@@@eL`@@hHCFH`iLX`@H@@@@Tr@B@`iLX`@As`AB`@@@@PICH@@As`ABtMC
FH@B@@@@eL`@@tMCFHP~LX`@H@@@@Tr@B@P~LX`@Ut`AB`@@@@PICH@@Ut`ABDSCFH@B@@@@eL`
@@DSCFHPSMX`@H@@@@Tr@B@PSMX`@hu`AB`@@@@PICH@@hu`ABPXCFH@B@@@@eL`@@PXCFH@hMX
`@H@@@@Tr@B@@hMX`@|v`AB`@@@@PICH@@|v`AB`]CFH@B@@@@eL`@@`]CFH@}MX`@H@@@@Tr@B
@@}MX`@Ox`AB`@@@@PICH@@Ox`ABlbCFH@B@@@@eL`@@lbCFHpQNX`@H@@@@Tr@B@pQNX`@cy`A
B`@@@@PICH@@cy`AB|gCFH@B@@@@eL`@@|gCFHpfNX`@H@@@@Tr@B@pfNX`@vz`AB`@@@@PICH@
@vz`ABHmCFH@B@@@@eL`@@HmCFH`{NX`@H@@@@Tr@B@`{NX`@J|`AB`@@@@PICH@@J|`ABXrCFH
@B@@@@eL`@@XrCFH`POX`@H@@@@Tr@B@`POX`@^}`AB`@@@@PICH@@^}`ABdwCFH@B@@@@eL`@@
dwCFHPeOX`@H@@@@Tr@B@PeOX`@q~`AB`@@@@PICH@@q~`ABt|CFH@B@@@@eL`@@t|CFHPzOX`@
H@@@@Tr@B@PzOX`@E@aAB`@@@@PICH@@E@aAB@BDFH@B@@@@eL`@@@BDFH@OPX`@H@@@@Tr@B@@
OPX`@XAaAB`@@@@PICH@@XAaABPGDFH@B@@@@eL`@@PGDFH@dPX`@H@@@@Tr@B@@dPX`@lBaAB`
@@@@PICH@@lBaAB\LDFH@B@@@@eL`@@\LDFHpxPX`@H@@@@Tr@B@pxPX`@CaAB`@@@@PICH@@
CaABlQDFH@B@@@@eL`@@lQDFHpMQX`@H@@@@Tr@B@pMQX`@SEaAB`@@@@PICH@@SEaABxVDFH@B
@@@@eL`@@xVDFH`bQX`@H@@@@Tr@B@`bQX`@fFaAB`@@@@PICH@@fFaABH\DFH@B@@@@eL`@@H\
DFH`wQX`@H@@@@Tr@B@`wQX`@zGaAB`@@@@PICH@@zGaABXaDFH@B@@@@eL`@@XaDFHPLRX`@H@
@@@Tr@B@PLRX`@MIaAB`@@@@PICH@@MIaABdfDFH@B@@@@eL`@@dfDFHPaRX`@H@@@@Tr@B@PaR
X`@aJaAB`@@@@PICH@@aJaABtkDFH@B@@@@eL`@@tkDFH@vRX`@H@@@@Tr@B@@vRX`@tKaAB`@@
@@PICH@@tKaAB@qDFH@B@@@@eL`@@@qDFH@KSX`@H@@@@Tr@B@@KSX`@HMaAB`@@@@PICH@@HMa
ABPvDFH@B@@@@eL`@@PvDFHp_SX`@H@@@@Tr@B@p_SX`@[NaAB`@@@@PICH@@[NaAB\{DFH@B@@
@@eL`@@\{DFHptSX`@H@@@@Tr@B@ptSX`@oOaAB`@@@@PICH@@oOaABl@EFH@B@@@@eL`@@l@EF
H`ITX`@H@@@@Tr@B@`ITX`@BQaAB`@@@@PICH@@BQaABxEEFH@B@@@@eL`@@xEEFH`^TX`@H@@@
@Tr@B@`^TX`@VRaAB`@@@@PICH@@VRaABHKEFH@B@@@@eL`@@HKEFH`sTX`@H@@@@Tr@B@`sTX`
@iSaAB`@@@@PICH@@iSaABTPEFH@B@@@@eL`@@TPEFHPHUX`@H@@@@Tr@B@PHUX`@}TaAB`@@@@
PICH@@}TaABdUEFH@B@@@@eL`@@dUEFHP]UX`@H@@@@Tr@B@P]UX`@PVaAB`@@@@PICH@@PVaAB
pZEFH@B@@@@eL`@@pZEFH@rUX`@H@@@@Tr@B@@rUX`@dWaAB`@@@@PICH@@dWaAB@`EFH@B@@@@
eL`@@@`EFH@GVX`@H@@@@Tr@B@@GVX`@wXaAB`@@@@PICH@@wXaABLeEFH@B@@@@eL`@@LeEFHp
[VX`@H@@@@Tr@B@p[VX`@KZaAB`@@@@PICH@@KZaAB\jEFH@B@@@@eL`@@\jEFHppVX`@H@@@@T
r@B@ppVX`@^[aAB`@@@@PICH@@^[aABhoEFH@B@@@@eL`@@hoEFH`EWX`@H@@@@Tr@B@`EWX`@r
\aABd@@@@`~B@@@H@@@@|O@C`H@P@@@@PKAX@@D@@@@@_@I@@B@@@@eL`@@xX@fs`jAXNCH@@@
@Tr@B@`jAXNCFG`yL`@@@@PICH@@FG`yLD^@fs@B@@@@eL`@@D^@fsPAXNCH@@@@Tr@B@PAXN
CYH`yL`@@@@PICH@@YH`yLTc@fs@B@@@@eL`@@Tc@fsPTBXNCH@@@@Tr@B@PTBXNCmI`yL`@@@@
PICH@@mI`yL`h@fs@B@@@@eL`@@`h@fs@iBXNCH@@@@Tr@B@@iBXNC@K`yL`@@@@PICH@@@K`yL
pm@fs@B@@@@eL`@@pm@fs@~BXNCH@@@@Tr@B@@~BXNCTL`yL`@@@@PICH@@TL`yL|r@fs@B@@@@
eL`@@|r@fspRCXNCH@@@@Tr@B@pRCXNCgMPyL`@@@@PICH@@gMPyLLx@ds@B@@@@eL`@@Lx@dsp
gCHNCJ@@@@Tr@C@pgCHNCmN@xLl{@^s`B@@@@eLp@@l{@^s@rClMCVOpuLh@@@@PICL@@VOpuLP
~@Rs`|CpLCJ@@@@Tr@C@`|CpLC@PPqLx@A|r`B@@@@eLp@@x@A|r@GDHKCjPpiLh@@@@PICL@@j
PpiL`CAZr`QDpHCJ@@@@Tr@C@`QDpHCTQ@_LHFAkq`B@@@@eLp@@HFAkq@\D`EC~Q@QLh@@@@PI
CL@@~Q@QLlHAopPfDdACJ@@@@Tr@C@PfDdACgRP@LTKAho`B@@@@eLp@@TKAhoppDx|BQSplKh@
@@@PICL@@QSplK|MAWnP{DlwBJ@@@@Tr@C@P{DlwB{S`WKdPA@m`B@@@@eLp@@dPA@mpEEHrBeT
@AKh@@@@PICL@@eT@AKHSAek@PETlBH@@@@Tr@B@@PETlB\U`aJ`@@@@PICH@@\U`aJ`WAGi`B@
@@@eLp@@`WAGi`aE\bBTVpAJh@@@@PICL@@TVpAJHZAhg@lEd\BH@@@@Tr@B@@lEd\BLWpbI`@@
@@PICH@@LWpbI\^ANe@B@@@@eL`@@\^ANep@FLQBH@@@@Tr@B@p@FLQB_XPvH`@@@@PICH@@_XP
vHlcAab@B@@@@eL`@@lcAabpUFlFBJ@@@@Tr@C@pUFlFBeY@THLgAv`@B@@@@eL`@@LgAv``cFL
@BH@@@@Tr@B@`cFL@BjZ`tG`@@@@PICH@@jZ`tGXlAc^@B@@@@eL`@@XlAc^`xFXwAJ@@@@Tr@C
@`xFXwAp[@XGxoAJ]`B@@@@eLp@@xoAJ]@CGTsAZ\PHG`@@@@PICH@@Z\PHGXsAy[`B@@@@eLp@
@XsAy[pPGTnAQ]`tF`@@@@PICH@@Q]`tFtvAmZ@B@@@@eL`@@tvAmZPbGhhAH@@@@Tr@B@PbGhh
Ae^@ZFh@@@@PICL@@e^@ZFL{AWYPpG\dAH@@@@Tr@B@PpG\dA]_@JFh@@@@PICL@@]_@JFh~AYX
@~Gl`AJ@@@@Tr@C@@~Gl`AF`@EPABnW`B@@@@eLp@@PABnW`HH@^Ap`ptEh@@@@PICL@@p`ptE
xCBEW@SH`[AH@@@@Tr@B@@SH`[AhapgE`@@@@PICH@@hapgEPHBGV@B@@@@eL`@@PHBGVpgH@WA
H@@@@Tr@B@pgH@WA{b`VEh@@@@PICL@@{b`VEdLBOUpuHPTAJ@@@@Tr@C@puHPTAec`NELOBpT@
B@@@@eL`@@LOBpTpCIpQAH@@@@Tr@B@pCIpQAkdPBE`@@@@PICH@@kdPBEXTBwS@B@@@@eL`@@X
TBwS`XIXNAH@@@@Tr@B@`XIXNA~ePuD`@@@@PICH@@~ePuDhYBES@B@@@@eL`@@hYBES`mITKAH
@@@@Tr@B@`mITKARg`iD`@@@@PICH@@Rg`iDx^BXR@B@@@@eL`@@x^BXRPBJhHAH@@@@Tr@B@PB
JhHAehP_D`@@@@PICH@@ehP_DDdBpQ@B@@@@eL`@@DdBpQPWJPFAH@@@@Tr@B@PWJPFAyi@VD`@
@@@PICH@@yi@VDTiBLQ@B@@@@eL`@@TiBLQ@lJDDAH@@@@Tr@B@@lJDDALk`MD`@@@@PICH@@Lk
`MD`nBlP@B@@@@eL`@@`nBlP@AKHBAH@@@@Tr@B@@AKHBA`l@FD`@@@@PICH@@`l@FDpsBOP@B@
@@@eL`@@psBOPpUKX@AH@@@@Tr@B@pUKX@AsmPC`@@@@PICH@@smPC|xBtO@B@@@@eL`@@|xB
tOpjKp~@H@@@@Tr@B@pjKp~@Go@yC`@@@@PICH@@Go@yCL~B\O@B@@@@eL`@@L~B\O`KT}@H@@
@@Tr@B@`KT}@Zp`sC`@@@@PICH@@Zp`sCXCCGO@B@@@@eL`@@XCCGO`TL@|@H@@@@Tr@B@`TL@
|@nqPnC`@@@@PICH@@nqPnChHCsN`B@@@@eLp@@hHCsN@fL|z@fr@kC`@@@@PICH@@fr@kCDLCf
N@B@@@@eL`@@DLCfNPwL@z@H@@@@Tr@B@PwL@z@yspfCh@@@@PICL@@yspfC\PCXNPEMTy@H@@@
@Tr@B@PEMTy@qt@dCh@@@@PICL@@qt@dC|SCMNPSMhx@H@@@@Tr@B@PSMhx@huPaC`@@@@PICH@
@huPaCPXC@N@B@@@@eL`@@PXC@N@hMlw@H@@@@Tr@B@@hMlw@|vp]C`@@@@PICH@@|vp]C`]CrM
@B@@@@eL`@@`]CrM@}Mxv@H@@@@Tr@B@@}Mxv@OxPZC`@@@@PICH@@OxPZClbCeM@B@@@@eL`@@
lbCeMpQNDv@H@@@@Tr@B@pQNDv@cyPWC`@@@@PICH@@cyPWC|gCYM@B@@@@eL`@@|gCYMpfNTu@
H@@@@Tr@B@pfNTu@vzPTC`@@@@PICH@@vzPTCHmCMM@B@@@@eL`@@HmCMM`{Nht@J@@@@Tr@C@`
{Nht@|{@RChpCFM@B@@@@eL`@@hpCFM`IOLt@H@@@@Tr@B@`IOLt@B}@PCh@@@@PICL@@B}@PC@
uC~L`WOps@H@@@@Tr@B@`WOps@y}PNC`@@@@PICH@@y}PNCTyCvL@B@@@@eL`@@TyCvLPlOLs@H
@@@@Tr@B@PlOLs@M@LC`@@@@PICH@@M@LCd~CmL@B@@@@eL`@@d~CmLPAPhr@H@@@@Tr@B@PA
Phr@`@qIC`@@@@PICH@@`@qICpCDeL@B@@@@eL`@@pCDeL@VPHr@H@@@@Tr@B@@VPHr@tAqGC`@
@@@PICH@@tAqGC@ID]L`B@@@@eLp@@@ID]L`gPlq@lBaFC`@@@@PICH@@lBaFC\LDXL@B@@@@eL
`@@\LDXLpxPXq@J@@@@Tr@C@pxPXq@qCAEC|ODSL@B@@@@eL`@@|ODSLpFQDq@H@@@@Tr@B@pFQ
Dq@wDqCCh@@@@PICL@@wDqCCTTDMLpTQpp@H@@@@Tr@B@pTQpp@nEaBC`@@@@PICH@@nEaBChXD
HL@B@@@@eL`@@hXDHL`iQXp@H@@@@Tr@B@`iQXp@BGAAC`@@@@PICH@@BGAACx]DBL@B@@@@eL`
@@x]DBL`~Q@p@H@@@@Tr@B@`~Q@p@VHaB`@@@@PICH@@VHaBDcD|K@B@@@@eL`@@DcD|KPSRh
o@H@@@@Tr@B@PSRho@iIA~B`@@@@PICH@@iIA~BThDwK@B@@@@eL`@@ThDwKPhRTo@H@@@@Tr@B
@PhRTo@}Jq|B`@@@@PICH@@}Jq|B`mDqK@B@@@@eL`@@`mDqK@}R@o@H@@@@Tr@B@@}R@o@PLa{
B`@@@@PICH@@PLa{BprDmK@B@@@@eL`@@prDmK@RSln@H@@@@Tr@B@@RSln@dMQzB`@@@@PICH@
@dMQzB|wDhK@B@@@@eL`@@|wDhKpfSXn@H@@@@Tr@B@pfSXn@wNQyB`@@@@PICH@@wNQyBL}DcK
@B@@@@eL`@@L}DcKp{SHn@H@@@@Tr@B@p{SHn@KPQxB`@@@@PICH@@KPQxBXBE_K@B@@@@eL`@@
XBE_K`PTxm@H@@@@Tr@B@`PTxm@^QAwB`@@@@PICH@@^QAwBhGE[K@B@@@@eL`@@hGE[K`eThm@
H@@@@Tr@B@`eThm@rRQvB`@@@@PICH@@rRQvBxLEWK@B@@@@eL`@@xLEWKPzTXm@H@@@@Tr@B@P
zTXm@ETQuB`@@@@PICH@@ETQuBDRETK@B@@@@eL`@@DRETKPOUHm@H@@@@Tr@B@POUHm@YUQtB`
@@@@PICH@@YUQtBTWEPK@B@@@@eL`@@TWEPK@dU|l@H@@@@Tr@B@@dU|l@lVasB`@@@@PICH@@l
VasB`\EMK@B@@@@eL`@@`\EMK@yUpl@H@@@@Tr@B@@yUpl@@XqrB`@@@@PICH@@@XqrBpaEJK@B
@@@@eL`@@paEJKpMVdl@H@@@@Tr@B@pMVdl@SYArB`@@@@PICH@@SYArB|fEGK@B@@@@eL`@@|f
EGKpbVXl@H@@@@Tr@B@pbVXl@gZQqB`@@@@PICH@@gZQqBLlEDK@B@@@@eL`@@LlEDK`wVLl@H@
@@@Tr@B@`wVLl@z[apB`@@@@PICH@@z[apBXqEAK@B@@@@eL`@@XqEAK`LW@l@I@@@@ho@@@@B@
@@@CH`@HB@D@@@@tR@I@@A@@@@pG`A@`@@@@PICH@@NF`yLhZ@fs@B@@@@eL`@@hZ@fs`qAXNC
H@@@@Tr@B@`qAXNCaG`yL`@@@@PICH@@aG`yLt_@fs@B@@@@eL`@@t_@fsPFBXNCH@@@@Tr@B@P
FBXNCuH`yL`@@@@PICH@@uH`yLDe@fs@B@@@@eL`@@De@fsP[BXNCH@@@@Tr@B@P[BXNCHJ`yL`
@@@@PICH@@HJ`yLPj@fs@B@@@@eL`@@Pj@fs@pBXNCH@@@@Tr@B@@pBXNC\K`yL`@@@@PICH@@\
K`yL`o@fs@B@@@@eL`@@`o@fs@ECXNCH@@@@Tr@B@@ECXNCoL`yL`@@@@PICH@@oL`yLlt@fs@B
@@@@eL`@@lt@fspYCXNCH@@@@Tr@B@pYCXNCCN`yL`@@@@PICH@@CN`yL|y@fs@B@@@@eL`@@|y
@fspnCXNCH@@@@Tr@B@pnCXNCVO`yL`@@@@PICH@@VO`yLH@fs@B@@@@eL`@@H@fs`CDXNCH@
@@@Tr@B@`CDXNCjP`yL`@@@@PICH@@jP`yLXDAfs@B@@@@eL`@@XDAfs`XDXNCH@@@@Tr@B@`XD
XNC~Q`yL`@@@@PICH@@~Q`yLdIAfs@B@@@@eL`@@dIAfsPmDXNCH@@@@Tr@B@PmDXNCQS`yL`@@
@@PICH@@QS`yLtNAfs@B@@@@eL`@@tNAfsPBEXNCH@@@@Tr@B@PBEXNCeT`yL`@@@@PICH@@eT`
yL@TAfs@B@@@@eL`@@@TAfs@WEXNCH@@@@Tr@B@@WEXNCxU`yL`@@@@PICH@@xU`yLPYAfs@B@@
@@eL`@@PYAfs@lEXNCH@@@@Tr@B@@lEXNCLW`yL`@@@@PICH@@LW`yL\^Afs@B@@@@eL`@@\^Af
sp@FXNCH@@@@Tr@B@p@FXNC_X`yL`@@@@PICH@@_X`yLlcAfs@B@@@@eL`@@lcAfspUFXNCH@@@
@Tr@B@pUFXNCsY`yL`@@@@PICH@@sY`yLxhAfs@B@@@@eL`@@xhAfs`jFXNCH@@@@Tr@B@`jFXN
CF[`yL`@@@@PICH@@F[`yLHnAfs@B@@@@eL`@@HnAfs`FXNCH@@@@Tr@B@`FXNCZ\`yL`@@@@
PICH@@Z\`yLXsAfs@B@@@@eL`@@XsAfsPTGXNCH@@@@Tr@B@PTGXNCm]`yL`@@@@PICH@@m]`yL
dxAfs@B@@@@eL`@@dxAfsPiGXNCH@@@@Tr@B@PiGXNCA_`yL`@@@@PICH@@A_`yLt}Afs`B@@@@
eLp@@t}Afs`zGTNCx_PyL`@@@@PICH@@x_PyLPABes@B@@@@eL`@@PABes@LHPNCH@@@@Tr@B@@
LHPNCLapxL`@@@@PICH@@LapxL`FBas`B@@@@eLp@@`FBas`]H|MCDbPwLh@@@@PICL@@DbPwLD
IB[spgHdMCJ@@@@Tr@C@pgHdMCmb`uLlKBRs`B@@@@eLp@@lKBRsPrHxLCWc`rLh@@@@PICL@@W
c`rLTNBEsp|H|KCJ@@@@Tr@C@p|H|KCAdPnL|PBrr`B@@@@eLp@@|PBrrPGIhJCkd`hLh@@@@PI
CL@@kd`hL`SBXr`QIxHCJ@@@@Tr@C@`QIxHCTep`LHVBwq`B@@@@eLp@@HVBwq@\IhFC~ePWLh@
@@@PICL@@~ePWLpXBNq`fI|CCH@@@@Tr@B@`fI|CCvf`GLh@@@@PICL@@vf`GLP\BLp`tIhBJ@
@@@Tr@C@`tIhB`g`yKx^BRo`B@@@@eLp@@x^BRop~It{BIh@jKh@@@@PICL@@Ih@jK\aBRnPIJ
lwBH@@@@Tr@B@PIJlwBAi@SK`@@@@PICH@@Ai@SKteB[l`B@@@@eLp@@teB[lpZJHpByi@zJ`@@
@@PICH@@yi@zJTiBtj`B@@@@eLp@@TiBtj`hJdiBpj`_J`@@@@PICH@@pj`_JplBHi@B@@@@eL`
@@plBHi@zJDaBH@@@@Tr@B@@zJDaBDl`vI`@@@@PICH@@Dl`vI@rBcf@B@@@@eL`@@@rBcf@OKt
VBJ@@@@Tr@C@@OKtVBImPTI\uBvd@B@@@@eL`@@\uBvdp\K@PBH@@@@Tr@B@p\K@PBOnprH`@@@
@PICH@@OnprHlzBWb@B@@@@eL`@@lzBWbpqKPFBH@@@@Tr@B@pqKPFBco`LH`@@@@PICH@@co`L
HxBA``B@@@@eLp@@xBA`@CLd~AZpPtG`@@@@PICH@@ZpPtGXCCc^@B@@@@eL`@@XCCc^`TLXw
AJ@@@@Tr@C@`TLXwA`q@XGxFCJ]@B@@@@eL`@@xFCJ]`bL@rAH@@@@Tr@B@`bL@rAfrp}F`@@@@
PICH@@frp}FDLCO[@B@@@@eL`@@DLCO[PwLdjAH@@@@Tr@B@PwLdjAys@aF`@@@@PICH@@ys@aF
TQC`Y`B@@@@eLp@@TQC`YpHMxdAqtPOF`@@@@PICH@@qtPOFtTC\X@B@@@@eL`@@tTC\X@ZMp_A
H@@@@Tr@B@@ZMp_ADvPwEh@@@@PICL@@DvPwEHYCNW@hM@\AH@@@@Tr@B@@hM@\A|vphE`@@@@P
ICH@@|vphE`]CGV@B@@@@eL`@@`]CGV@}MtVAH@@@@Tr@B@@}MtVAOx@UEh@@@@PICL@@Ox@UEt
aCGUpJNlSAJ@@@@Tr@C@pJNlSAyxpKE\dCdT@B@@@@eL`@@\dCdTpXNtPAH@@@@Tr@B@pXNtPA
yp}D`@@@@PICH@@yp}DliCbS@B@@@@eL`@@liCbS`mNxLAH@@@@Tr@B@`mNxLAR{pnD`@@@@PI
CH@@R{pnDxnChR@B@@@@eL`@@xnChR`BOXIAH@@@@Tr@B@`BOXIAf|PaD`@@@@PICH@@f|PaDHt
CuQ@B@@@@eL`@@HtCuQ`WOTFAJ@@@@Tr@C@`WOTFAk}PWDdwCUQ`B@@@@eLp@@dwCUQpaOxDAU~
pQDh@@@@PICL@@U~pQDLzCPPlO`CAJ@@@@Tr@C@PlO`CA~PLDt|CkP`B@@@@eLp@@t|CkPpvO
PBAiPGDh@@@@PICL@@iPGD\CWPPAPDAAJ@@@@Tr@C@PAPDAAR@aBD@BDDP`B@@@@eLp@@@BD
DP`KPx@|@Q~Ch@@@@PICL@@|@Q~ChDDsO@VPt~@H@@@@Tr@B@@VPt~@tAaxC`@@@@PICH@@tAa
xC@IDXO@B@@@@eL`@@@IDXO@kPx|@H@@@@Tr@B@@kPx|@GCAqC`@@@@PICH@@GCAqCLNDzN@B@@
@@eL`@@LNDzNpPD{@H@@@@Tr@B@pPD{@[DAjC`@@@@PICH@@[DAjC\SD`N`B@@@@eLp@@\SD`
NPQQly@SEqeC`@@@@PICH@@SEqeCxVDON@B@@@@eL`@@xVDON`bQ`x@H@@@@Tr@B@`bQ`x@fFA`
C`@@@@PICH@@fFA`CH\DyM@B@@@@eL`@@H\DyM`wQHw@H@@@@Tr@B@`wQHw@zGqZC`@@@@PICH@
@zGqZCXaDeM`B@@@@eLp@@XaDeMpHRDv@qHaWC`@@@@PICH@@qHaWCtdDXM@B@@@@eL`@@tdDXM
PZRHu@H@@@@Tr@B@PZRHu@EJQSCh@@@@PICL@@EJQSCLiDJMPhR\t@H@@@@Tr@B@PhR\t@}JaPC
h@@@@PICL@@}JaPChlDL@vRps@H@@@@Tr@B@@vRps@tKqMC`@@@@PICH@@tKqMC@qDrL@B@@@@
eL`@@@qDrL@KSxr@H@@@@Tr@B@@KSxr@HMQJC`@@@@PICH@@HMQJCPvDdL@B@@@@eL`@@PvDdLp
_S@r@H@@@@Tr@B@p_S@r@[NAGC`@@@@PICH@@[NAGC\{DXL@B@@@@eL`@@\{DXLptSPq@H@@@@T
r@B@ptSPq@oOADC`@@@@PICH@@oOADCl@ELL@B@@@@eL`@@l@ELL`IT`p@H@@@@Tr@B@`IT`p@B
QQACh@@@@PICL@@BQQAC@EECL`WTDp@H@@@@Tr@B@`WTDp@zQaBh@@@@PICL@@zQaB`HE|K`e
Tho@H@@@@Tr@B@`eTho@rRq}B`@@@@PICH@@rRq}BxLEtK@B@@@@eL`@@xLEtKPzTDo@H@@@@Tr
@B@PzTDo@ETa{B`@@@@PICH@@ETa{BDREkK@B@@@@eL`@@DREkKPOU`n@H@@@@Tr@B@POU`n@YU
ayB`@@@@PICH@@YUayBTWEcK@B@@@@eL`@@TWEcK@dU@n@H@@@@Tr@B@@dU@n@lVawBh@@@@PIC
L@@lVawBh[E\K@rUlm@H@@@@Tr@B@@rUlm@dWQvB`@@@@PICH@@dWQvB@`EWK`B@@@@eLp@@@`E
WK`CVTm@\XAuB`@@@@PICH@@\XAuB\cERK@B@@@@eL`@@\cERKpTV@m@H@@@@Tr@B@pTV@m@oYa
sB`@@@@PICH@@oYasBlhELK@B@@@@eL`@@lhELKpiVhl@H@@@@Tr@B@piVhl@C[ArB`@@@@PICH
@@C[ArBxmEFK@B@@@@eL`@@xmEFK`~VPl@H@@@@Tr@B@`~VPl@V\apB`@@@@PICH@@V\apBHsE@
KPB@@@@zK@@@`A@@@pLYZF@b@@A@@@@mD`A@P@@@@@|Ad@@H@@@@Tr@B@`cAXNCjF`yL`@@@@PI
CH@@jF`yLX\@fs@B@@@@eL`@@X\@fsPxAXNCH@@@@Tr@B@PxAXNC}G`yL`@@@@PICH@@}G`yLda
@fs@B@@@@eL`@@da@fsPMBXNCH@@@@Tr@B@PMBXNCQI`yL`@@@@PICH@@QI`yLtf@fs@B@@@@eL
`@@tf@fs@bBXNCH@@@@Tr@B@@bBXNCdJ`yL`@@@@PICH@@dJ`yL@l@fs@B@@@@eL`@@@l@fs@wB
XNCH@@@@Tr@B@@wBXNCxK`yL`@@@@PICH@@xK`yLPq@fs@B@@@@eL`@@Pq@fspKCXNCH@@@@Tr@
B@pKCXNCKM`yL`@@@@PICH@@KM`yL\v@fs@B@@@@eL`@@\v@fsp`CXNCH@@@@Tr@B@p`CXNC_N`
yL`@@@@PICH@@_N`yLl{@fs@B@@@@eL`@@l{@fs`uCXNCH@@@@Tr@B@`uCXNCrO`yL`@@@@PICH
@@rO`yLx@Afs@B@@@@eL`@@x@Afs`JDXNCH@@@@Tr@B@`JDXNCFQ`yL`@@@@PICH@@FQ`yLHFAf
s@B@@@@eL`@@HFAfs`_DXNCH@@@@Tr@B@`_DXNCYR`yL`@@@@PICH@@YR`yLTKAfs@B@@@@eL`@
@TKAfsPtDXNCH@@@@Tr@B@PtDXNCmS`yL`@@@@PICH@@mS`yLdPAfs@B@@@@eL`@@dPAfsPIEXN
CH@@@@Tr@B@PIEXNC@U`yL`@@@@PICH@@@U`yLpUAfs@B@@@@eL`@@pUAfs@^EXNCH@@@@Tr@B@
@^EXNCTV`yL`@@@@PICH@@TV`yL@[Afs@B@@@@eL`@@@[Afs@sEXNCH@@@@Tr@B@@sEXNCgW`yL
`@@@@PICH@@gW`yLL`Afs@B@@@@eL`@@L`AfspGFXNCH@@@@Tr@B@pGFXNC{X`yL`@@@@PICH@@
{X`yL\eAfs@B@@@@eL`@@\eAfsp\FXNCH@@@@Tr@B@p\FXNCNZ`yL`@@@@PICH@@NZ`yLhjAfs@
B@@@@eL`@@hjAfs`qFXNCH@@@@Tr@B@`qFXNCb[`yL`@@@@PICH@@b[`yLxoAfs@B@@@@eL`@@x
oAfs`FGXNCH@@@@Tr@B@`FGXNCv\`yL`@@@@PICH@@v\`yLDuAfs@B@@@@eL`@@DuAfsP[GXNCH
@@@@Tr@B@P[GXNCI^`yL`@@@@PICH@@I^`yLTzAfs@B@@@@eL`@@TzAfsPpGXNCH@@@@Tr@B@Pp
GXNC]_`yL`@@@@PICH@@]_`yL`Afs@B@@@@eL`@@`Afs@EHXNCH@@@@Tr@B@@EHXNCp``yL`@
@@@PICH@@p``yLpDBfs@B@@@@eL`@@pDBfs@ZHXNCH@@@@Tr@B@@ZHXNCDb`yL`@@@@PICH@@Db
`yL|IBfs`B@@@@eLp@@|IBfsPkHTNC{bPyL`@@@@PICH@@{bPyL\MBes@B@@@@eL`@@\MBesp|H
PNCH@@@@Tr@B@p|HPNCOdpxL`@@@@PICH@@OdpxLlRBbs@B@@@@eL`@@lRBbs`QI@NCH@@@@Tr@
B@`QI@NCbe`wL`@@@@PICH@@be`wLxWB[s@B@@@@eL`@@xWB[s`fI\MCJ@@@@Tr@C@`fI\MChfP
uLX[BSs`B@@@@eLp@@X[BSs@qI@MCRgPsL`@@@@PICH@@RgPsLx^BGs@B@@@@eL`@@x^BGsPBJ@
LCJ@@@@Tr@C@PBJ@LCWh@oLTbBwr`B@@@@eLp@@TbBwrpLJLKCAi`kLh@@@@PICL@@Ai`kL|dBi
rPWJLJCH@@@@Tr@B@PWJLJCyipeLh@@@@PICL@@yipeL\hBPrPeJdHCJ@@@@Tr@C@PeJdHCbj``
L@kB{q@B@@@@eL`@@@kB{q@sJlFCH@@@@Tr@B@@sJlFChk`VL`@@@@PICH@@hk`VLPpBHq@B@@@
@eL`@@PpBHq@HKTCCH@@@@Tr@B@@HKTCC|lPHLh@@@@PICL@@|lPHLdtBVppUKl@CH@@@@Tr@B@
pUKl@CsmP}K`@@@@PICH@@smP}K|xB^o`B@@@@eLp@@|xB^oPgKL}BknpqKh@@@@PICL@@knpqK
d{B{npqKxzBH@@@@Tr@B@pqKxzBcoPeK`@@@@PICH@@coPeKxB|m@B@@@@eL`@@xB|m`FLHvB
H@@@@Tr@B@`FLHvBvppQK`@@@@PICH@@vppQKHECll@B@@@@eL`@@HECll`[LDqBH@@@@Tr@B@`
[LDqBJr`}J`@@@@PICH@@Jr`}JXJC[k@B@@@@eL`@@XJC[kPpL|kBH@@@@Tr@B@PpL|kB]sphJ`
@@@@PICH@@]sphJdOCHj`B@@@@eLp@@dOCHjpAMhgBUt@[J`@@@@PICH@@Ut@[JDSCQi@B@@@@e
L`@@DSCQiPSMXcBH@@@@Tr@B@PSMXcBhupFJ`@@@@PICH@@hupFJPXC@h@B@@@@eL`@@PXC@h@h
MT^BH@@@@Tr@B@@hMT^B|vprI`@@@@PICH@@|vprI`]Cqf@B@@@@eL`@@`]Cqf@}M\YBH@@@@Tr
@B@@}M\YBOx`_Ih@@@@PICL@@Ox`_ItaCqepJNPVBJ@@@@Tr@C@pJNPVByx@VI\dCLe`B@@@@eL
p@@\dCLePUN|SBcypLI`@@@@PICH@@cypLI|gC[d@B@@@@eL`@@|gC[dpfNPPBJ@@@@Tr@C@pfN
PPBhz@~HXkClc`B@@@@eLp@@XkClc@qNDNBR{`uH`@@@@PICH@@R{`uHxnCb@B@@@@eL`@@xnC
b`BOdJBH@@@@Tr@B@`BOdJBf|pdH`@@@@PICH@@f|pdHHtC~a@B@@@@eL`@@HtC~a`WOdFBH@@
@@Tr@B@`WOdFBy}PUH`@@@@PICH@@y}PUHTyCAa@B@@@@eL`@@TyCAaPlOtBBH@@@@Tr@B@PlOt
BBM`FH`@@@@PICH@@M`FHd~CG`@B@@@@eL`@@d~CG`PAPPAH@@@@Tr@B@PAPPA`@axG`@@@
@PICH@@`@axGpCDP_@B@@@@eL`@@pCDP_@VP|{AH@@@@Tr@B@@VP|{AtAakG`@@@@PICH@@tAak
G@ID]^@B@@@@eL`@@@ID]^@kPtxAH@@@@Tr@B@@kPtxAGCQ_G`@@@@PICH@@GCQ_GLNDm]@B@@@
@eL`@@LNDm]pPxuAH@@@@Tr@B@pPxuA[DqSG`@@@@PICH@@[DqSG\SD@]@B@@@@eL`@@\SD@]
pTQDsAH@@@@Tr@B@pTQDsAnEqHG`@@@@PICH@@nEqHGhXDV\@B@@@@eL`@@hXDV\`iQ`pAH@@@@
Tr@B@`iQ`pABGq~F`@@@@PICH@@BGq~Fx]Dn[@B@@@@eL`@@x]Dn[`~QDnAH@@@@Tr@B@`~QDnA
VHQuF`@@@@PICH@@VHQuFDcDI[@B@@@@eL`@@DcDI[PSRtkAH@@@@Tr@B@PSRtkAiIQlF`@@@@P
ICH@@iIQlFThDfZ@B@@@@eL`@@ThDfZPhRliAH@@@@Tr@B@PhRliA}JAdF`@@@@PICH@@}JAdF`
mDEZ@B@@@@eL`@@`mDEZ@}RhgAH@@@@Tr@B@@}RhgAPLA\F`@@@@PICH@@PLA\FprDfY@B@@@@e
L`@@prDfY@RSpeAH@@@@Tr@B@@RSpeAdMqTFh@@@@PICL@@dMqTFDwDNYp_SddAH@@@@Tr@B@p_
SddA[NAPF`@@@@PICH@@[NAPF\{DwX@B@@@@eL`@@\{DwXptSxbAH@@@@Tr@B@ptSxbAoOQIF`@
@@@PICH@@oOQIFl@E]X`B@@@@eLp@@l@E]X@FT`aAfPAEF`@@@@PICH@@fPAEFHDELX@B@@@@eL
`@@HDELX`WTP`AH@@@@Tr@B@`WTP`AzQAE`@@@@PICH@@zQAEXIEuW@B@@@@eL`@@XIEuW`lT
t^AH@@@@Tr@B@`lTt^ANSayE`@@@@PICH@@NSayEdNE^W@B@@@@eL`@@dNE^WPAU\]AH@@@@Tr@
B@PAU\]AaTAtE`@@@@PICH@@aTAtEtSEIW@B@@@@eL`@@tSEIWPVUH\AH@@@@Tr@B@PVUH\AuUA
oEh@@@@PICL@@uUAoEHXExV@dUT[AH@@@@Tr@B@@dUT[AlVqkE`@@@@PICH@@lVqkE`\EiV@B@@
@@eL`@@`\EiV@yULZAH@@@@Tr@B@@yULZA@XQgE`@@@@PICH@@@XQgEpaEWV@B@@@@eL`@@paEW
VpMVDYAH@@@@Tr@B@pMVDYASYqbE`@@@@PICH@@SYqbE|fEEV@B@@@@eL`@@|fEEVpbV@XAH@@@
@Tr@B@pbV@XAgZq^Eh@@@@PICL@@gZq^ETkExUppVTWAH@@@@Tr@B@ppVTWA^[A\E`@@@@PICH@
@^[A\EhoEkU@B@@@@eL`@@hoEkU`EWXVAH@@@@Tr@B@`EWXVAr\QXEd@@@@`~B@@@H@@@@@@@@@
`H@P@@@@PKAd@@D@@@@@_@F@@B@@@@eL`@@xX@Xs`jAhLCH@@@@Tr@B@`jAhLCFG@oL`@@@@PIC
H@@FG@oLD^@nr@B@@@@eL`@@D^@nrPA@JCH@@@@Tr@B@PA@JCYH`dL`@@@@PICH@@YH`dLTc@
Er@B@@@@eL`@@Tc@ErPTB\GCH@@@@Tr@B@PTB\GCmIPZL`@@@@PICH@@mIPZL`h@[q@B@@@@eL`
@@`h@[q@iBtDCH@@@@Tr@B@@iBtDC@KpOL`@@@@PICH@@@KpOLpm@qp@B@@@@eL`@@pm@qp@~BL
BCH@@@@Tr@B@@~BLBCTLPEL`@@@@PICH@@TLPEL|r@Gp@B@@@@eL`@@|r@GppRCdBH@@@@Tr@B
@pRCdBgMpzK`@@@@PICH@@gMpzKLx@^o@B@@@@eL`@@Lx@^opgC@}BH@@@@Tr@B@pgC@}B{N`p
K`@@@@PICH@@{N`pKX}@tn@B@@@@eL`@@X}@tn`|CXzBH@@@@Tr@B@`|CXzBNP@fK`@@@@PICH@
@NP@fKhBAJn@B@@@@eL`@@hBAJn`QDpwBH@@@@Tr@B@`QDpwBbQ`[K`@@@@PICH@@bQ`[KxGA`m
@B@@@@eL`@@xGA`mPfDHuBH@@@@Tr@B@PfDHuBuR@QK`@@@@PICH@@uR@QKDMAvl@B@@@@eL`@@
DMAvlP{DdrBH@@@@Tr@B@P{DdrBITpFK`@@@@PICH@@ITpFKTRAMl@B@@@@eL`@@TRAMl@PE|oB
H@@@@Tr@B@@PE|oB\UP|J`@@@@PICH@@\UP|J`WAck@B@@@@eL`@@`WAck@eETmBH@@@@Tr@B@@
eETmBpVpqJ`@@@@PICH@@pVpqJp\Ayj@B@@@@eL`@@p\AyjpyEljBH@@@@Tr@B@pyEljBCXPgJ`
@@@@PICH@@CXPgJ|aAOj@B@@@@eL`@@|aAOjpNFHhBH@@@@Tr@B@pNFHhBWY@]J`@@@@PICH@@W
Y@]JLgAfi@B@@@@eL`@@LgAfi`cF`eBH@@@@Tr@B@`cF`eBjZ`RJ`@@@@PICH@@jZ`RJXlA|h@B
@@@@eL`@@XlA|h`xFxbBH@@@@Tr@B@`xFxbB~[@HJ`@@@@PICH@@~[@HJhqARh@B@@@@eL`@@hq
ARh`MGP`BH@@@@Tr@B@`MGP`BQ]`}I`@@@@PICH@@Q]`}ItvAhg@B@@@@eL`@@tvAhgPbGh]BH@
@@@Tr@B@PbGh]Be^PsI`@@@@PICH@@e^PsID|Af@B@@@@eL`@@D|AfPwGD[BH@@@@Tr@B@PwG
D[Bx_phI`@@@@PICH@@x_phIPABUf@B@@@@eL`@@PABUf@LH\XBH@@@@Tr@B@@LH\XBLaP^I`@@
@@PICH@@LaP^I`FBke@B@@@@eL`@@`FBke@aHtUBH@@@@Tr@B@@aHtUB_bpSI`@@@@PICH@@_bp
SIlKBAe@B@@@@eL`@@lKBAepuHLSBH@@@@Tr@B@puHLSBsc`II`@@@@PICH@@sc`II|PBXd@B@@
@@eL`@@|PBXdpJIhPBH@@@@Tr@B@pJIhPBFe@H`@@@@PICH@@Fe@HHVBnc@B@@@@eL`@@HVBn
c`_I@NBH@@@@Tr@B@`_I@NBZf`tH`@@@@PICH@@Zf`tHX[BDc@B@@@@eL`@@X[BDc`tIXKBH@@@
@Tr@B@`tIXKBng@jH`@@@@PICH@@ng@jHd`BZb@B@@@@eL`@@d`BZbPIJpHBH@@@@Tr@B@PIJpH
BAi`_H`@@@@PICH@@Ai`_HteBqa@B@@@@eL`@@teBqaP^JLFBH@@@@Tr@B@P^JLFBUjPUH`@@@@
PICH@@UjPUH@kBGa@B@@@@eL`@@@kBGa@sJdCBH@@@@Tr@B@@sJdCBhkpJH`@@@@PICH@@hkpJH
PpB]`@B@@@@eL`@@PpB]`@HK|@BH@@@@Tr@B@@HK|@B|lP@H`@@@@PICH@@|lP@H\uBs_@B@@@@
eL`@@\uBs_p\KT~AH@@@@Tr@B@p\KT~AOnpuG`@@@@PICH@@OnpuGlzBJ_@B@@@@eL`@@lzBJ_p
qKp{AH@@@@Tr@B@pqKp{Aco`kG`@@@@PICH@@co`kGxB`^@B@@@@eL`@@xB`^`FLHyAH@@@@T
r@B@`FLHyAvp@aG`@@@@PICH@@vp@aGHECv]@B@@@@eL`@@HECv]`[L`vAH@@@@Tr@B@`[L`vAJ
r`VG`@@@@PICH@@Jr`VGXJCL]@B@@@@eL`@@XJCL]PpLxsAH@@@@Tr@B@PpLxsA]s@LG`@@@@PI
CH@@]s@LGdOCb\@B@@@@eL`@@dOCb\PEMTqAH@@@@Tr@B@PEMTqAqtpAG`@@@@PICH@@qtpAGtT
Cy[@B@@@@eL`@@tTCy[@ZMlnAH@@@@Tr@B@@ZMlnADvPwF`@@@@PICH@@DvPwF@ZCO[@B@@@@eL
`@@@ZCO[@oMDlAH@@@@Tr@B@@oMDlAXwplF`@@@@PICH@@XwplFP_CeZ@B@@@@eL`@@P_CeZpCN
\iAH@@@@Tr@B@pCN\iAkxPbF`@@@@PICH@@kxPbF\dC{Y@B@@@@eL`@@\dC{YpXNxfAH@@@@Tr@
B@pXNxfAy@XF`@@@@PICH@@y@XFliCRY@B@@@@eL`@@liCRY`mNPdAH@@@@Tr@B@`mNPdAR{`
MF`@@@@PICH@@R{`MFxnChX@B@@@@eL`@@xnChX`BOhaAH@@@@Tr@B@`BOhaAf|@CF`@@@@PICH
@@f|@CFHtC~W@B@@@@eL`@@HtC~W`WO@_AH@@@@Tr@B@`WO@_Ay}`xE`@@@@PICH@@y}`xETyCT
W@B@@@@eL`@@TyCTWPlOX\AH@@@@Tr@B@PlOX\AMPnE`@@@@PICH@@MPnEd~CkV@B@@@@eL`@
@d~CkVPAPtYAH@@@@Tr@B@PAPtYA`@qcE`@@@@PICH@@`@qcEpCDAV@B@@@@eL`@@pCDAV@VPLW
AH@@@@Tr@B@@VPLWAtAQYE`@@@@PICH@@tAQYE@IDWU@B@@@@eL`@@@IDWU@kPdTAH@@@@Tr@B@
@kPdTAGCqNE`@@@@PICH@@GCqNELNDmT@B@@@@eL`@@LNDmTpP|QAH@@@@Tr@B@pP|QA[DaDE
`@@@@PICH@@[DaDE\SDDT@B@@@@eL`@@\SDDTpTQXOAH@@@@Tr@B@pTQXOAnEAzD`@@@@PICH@@
nEAzDhXDZS@B@@@@eL`@@hXDZS`iQpLAH@@@@Tr@B@`iQpLABGaoD`@@@@PICH@@BGaoDx]DpR@
B@@@@eL`@@x]DpR`~QHJAH@@@@Tr@B@`~QHJAVHAeD`@@@@PICH@@VHAeDDcDFR@B@@@@eL`@@D
cDFRPSR`GAH@@@@Tr@B@PSR`GAiIaZD`@@@@PICH@@iIaZDThD]Q@B@@@@eL`@@ThD]QPhR|DAH
@@@@Tr@B@PhR|DA}JQPD`@@@@PICH@@}JQPD`mDsP@B@@@@eL`@@`mDsP@}RTBAH@@@@Tr@B@@}
RTBAPLqED`@@@@PICH@@PLqEDprDIP@B@@@@eL`@@prDIP@RSl@H@@@@Tr@B@@RSl@dMQ{C`@
@@@PICH@@dMQ{C|wD_O@B@@@@eL`@@|wD_OpfSD}@H@@@@Tr@B@pfSD}@wNqpC`@@@@PICH@@wN
qpCL}DvN@B@@@@eL`@@L}DvNp{S`z@H@@@@Tr@B@p{S`z@KPafC`@@@@PICH@@KPafCXBELN@B@
@@@eL`@@XBELN`PTxw@H@@@@Tr@B@`PTxw@^QA\C`@@@@PICH@@^QA\ChGEbM@B@@@@eL`@@hGE
bM`eTPu@H@@@@Tr@B@`eTPu@rRaQC`@@@@PICH@@rRaQCxLExL@B@@@@eL`@@xLExLPzThr@H@@
@@Tr@B@PzThr@ETAGC`@@@@PICH@@ETAGCDRENL@B@@@@eL`@@DRENLPOUDp@H@@@@Tr@B@POUD
p@YUq|B`@@@@PICH@@YUq|BTWEeK@B@@@@eL`@@TWEeK@dU\m@H@@@@Tr@B@@dU\m@lVQrB`@@@
@PICH@@lVQrB`\E{J@B@@@@eL`@@`\E{J@yUtj@H@@@@Tr@B@@yUtj@@XqgB`@@@@PICH@@@Xqg
BpaEQJ@B@@@@eL`@@paEQJpMVLh@H@@@@Tr@B@pMVLh@SYQ]B`@@@@PICH@@SYQ]B|fEgI@B@@@
@eL`@@|fEgIpbVhe@H@@@@Tr@B@pbVhe@gZASB`@@@@PICH@@gZASBLlE~H@B@@@@eL`@@LlE~H
`wV@c@H@@@@Tr@B@`wV@c@z[aHB`@@@@PICH@@z[aHBXqETH@B@@@@eL`@@XqETH`LWX`@E@@@@
Pa@fs`cAT@@@@@EBXNCjFPA@@@@TH`yLX\@E@@@@Pa@fsPxAT@@@@@EBXNC}GPA@@@@TH`yLda@
E@@@@Pa@fsPMBT@@@@@EBXNCQIPA@@@@TH`yLtf@E@@@@Pa@fs@bBT@@@@@EBXNCdJPA@@@@TH`
yL@l@E@@@@Pa@fs@wBT@@@@@EBXNCxKPA@@@@TH`yLPq@E@@@@Pa@fspKCT@@@@@EBXNCKMPA@@
@@TH`yL\v@E@@@@Pa@fsp`CT@@@@@EBXNC_NPA@@@@TH`yLl{@E@@@@Pa@fs`uCT@@@@@EBXNCr
OPA@@@@TH`yLx@AE@@@@Pa@fs`JDT@@@@@EBXNCFQPA@@@@TH`yLHFAE@@@@Pa@fs`_DT@@@@@E
BXNCYRPA@@@@TH`yLTKAE@@@@Pa@fsPtDT@@@@@EBXNCmSPA@@@@TH`yLdPAE@@@@Pa@esPIET@
@@@@EBPNC@UPA@@@@TH@xLpUAE@@@@Pa@Xs@^ET@@@@@EBdLCTVPA@@@@THpkL@[AE@@@@Pa@Gr
@sET@@@@@EBxDCgWPA@@@@THP@LL`AE@@@@Pa@`npGFT@@@@@EBhrB{XPA@@@@THPhJ\eAE@@@@
Pa@Khp\FT@@@@@EBhVBNZPA@@@@THppHhjAE@@@@Pa@[``qFT@@@@@EBXwAb[PA@@@@TH@vFxoA
E@@@@Pa@BY`FGT@@@@@EB`[Av\PA@@@@THPNEDuAE@@@@Pa@GSP[GT@@@@@EBHFAI^PA@@@@THP
BDTzAE@@@@Pa@{NPpGT@@@@@EB\w@]_PA@@@@THPOC`AE@@@@Pa@LL@EHT@@@@@EBDn@p`PA@@
@@THPoBpDBE@@@@Pa@_J@ZHT@@@@@EBXh@DbPA@@@@THP\B|IBE@@@@Pa@_IpnHT@@@@@EB@e@W
cPA@@@@TH@QBLOBE@@@@Pa@yHpCIT@@@@@EBDc@kdPA@@@@TH`JBXTBE@@@@Pa@dH`XIT@@@@@E
B|a@~ePA@@@@THpFBhYBE@@@@Pa@WH`mIT@@@@@EBTa@RgPA@@@@TH`DBx^BE@@@@Pa@PHPBJT@
@@@@EB|`@ehPA@@@@THPCBDdBE@@@@Pa@LHPWJT@@@@@EBl`@yiPA@@@@TH`BBTiBE@@@@Pa@JH
@lJT@@@@@EBd`@LkPA@@@@THPBB`nBE@@@@Pa@HH@AKT@@@@@EB``@`lPA@@@@TH@BBpsBE@@@@
Pa@GHpUKT@@@@@EB\`@smPA@@@@THpAB|xBE@@@@Pa@GHpjKT@@@@@EB\`@GoPA@@@@THpABL~B
E@@@@Pa@GH`KT@@@@@EBX`@ZpPA@@@@TH`ABXCCE@@@@Pa@FH`TLT@@@@@EBX`@nqPA@@@@TH`
ABhHCE@@@@Pa@FH`iLT@@@@@EBX`@AsPA@@@@TH`ABtMCE@@@@Pa@FHP~LT@@@@@EBX`@UtPA@@
@@TH`ABDSCE@@@@Pa@FHPSMT@@@@@EBX`@huPA@@@@TH`ABPXCE@@@@Pa@FH@hMT@@@@@EBX`@|
vPA@@@@TH`AB`]CE@@@@Pa@FH@}MT@@@@@EBX`@OxPA@@@@TH`ABlbCE@@@@Pa@FHpQNT@@@@@E
BX`@cyPA@@@@TH`AB|gCE@@@@Pa@FHpfNT@@@@@EBX`@vzPA@@@@TH`ABHmCE@@@@Pa@FH`{NT@
@@@@EBX`@J|PA@@@@TH`ABXrCE@@@@Pa@FH`POT@@@@@EBX`@^}PA@@@@TH`ABdwCE@@@@Pa@FH
PeOT@@@@@EBX`@q~PA@@@@TH`ABt|CE@@@@Pa@FHPzOT@@@@@EBX`@E@QA@@@@TH`AB@BDE@@@@
Pa@FH@OPT@@@@@EBX`@XAQA@@@@TH`ABPGDE@@@@Pa@FH@dPT@@@@@EBX`@lBQA@@@@TH`AB\LD
E@@@@Pa@FHpxPT@@@@@EBX`@CQA@@@@TH`ABlQDE@@@@Pa@FHpMQT@@@@@EBX`@SEQA@@@@TH`
ABxVDE@@@@Pa@FH`bQT@@@@@EBX`@fFQA@@@@TH`ABH\DE@@@@Pa@FH`wQT@@@@@EBX`@zGQA@@
@@TH`ABXaDE@@@@Pa@FHPLRT@@@@@EBX`@MIQA@@@@TH`ABdfDE@@@@Pa@FHPaRT@@@@@EBX`@a
JQA@@@@TH`ABtkDE@@@@Pa@FH@vRT@@@@@EBX`@tKQA@@@@TH`AB@qDE@@@@Pa@FH@KST@@@@@E
BX`@HMQA@@@@TH`ABPvDE@@@@Pa@FHp_ST@@@@@EBX`@[NQA@@@@TH`AB\{DE@@@@Pa@FHptST@
@@@@EBX`@oOQA@@@@TH`ABl@EE@@@@Pa@FH`ITT@@@@@EBX`@BQQA@@@@TH`ABxEEE@@@@Pa@FH
`^TT@@@@@EBX`@VRQA@@@@TH`ABHKEE@@@@Pa@FH`sTT@@@@@EBX`@iSQA@@@@TH`ABTPEE@@@@
Pa@FHPHUT@@@@@EBX`@}TQA@@@@TH`ABdUEE@@@@Pa@FHP]UT@@@@@EBX`@PVQA@@@@TH`ABpZE
E@@@@Pa@FH@rUT@@@@@EBX`@dWQA@@@@TH`AB@`EE@@@@Pa@FH@GVT@@@@@EBX`@wXQA@@@@TH`
ABLeEE@@@@Pa@FHp[VT@@@@@EBX`@KZQA@@@@TH`AB\jEE@@@@Pa@FHppVT@@@@@EBX`@^[QA@@
@@TH`ABhoEE@@@@Pa@FH`EWT@@@@@EBX`@r\AA@@@@mDPA@P@@@@PKA\@@D@@@@tR@C@@A@@@@g
DpO@@@@`G@P@@@@PKA@@@D@@@@tR@H@@A@@@@mDPB@T@@@@P@B|CPA@@@@IH@@@@@@G@@@
@XAAvspPWd_@eE@A@@@@mDPA@P@@@@PKA\@@D@@@@tR@C@@A@@@@gDpO@@@@`G@P@@@@PKA@@
@D@@@@tR@H@@A@@@@mDPB@T@@@@P@B|CPA@@@@IH@@@@@@G@@@@XAAhz`vW@@@@@@A@@@@mD
P@@P@@@@PKAD@@D@@@@tR@A@@A@@@@mDPA@P@@@@PKA\@@D@@@@tR@C@@A@@@@gDpO@@@@`G@
P@@@@PKAD@@D@@@@tR@H@@A@@@@mDPB@T@@@@P@B|CPA@@@@IH@@@@@@G@@@@XAAiD@KPlF@
o^@A@@@@DDPC@P@@@@`@AD@@IA@@@HcB]BPoGpB@@@PRnYWYsQW[eyF]`TV\ueF[iIf\iEFHweF
]hArXouF\lUV[eyF]aIWZteVYsqA@}@@N@`C@x@PH@dE@x@PO@DB@\@@N@tC@}@@G@pA@\@PO@\
B@\@@N@pA@NA@G@DB@}@@G@`C@}@PV@tC@\@@N@dE@x@PO@DB@x@pI@pA@a@@G@`C@x@@A@@@@m
DP@@P@@@@PKAT@@D@@@@tR@G@@A@@@@mDp@@P@@@@pIA|C@@@@xA@D@@@@tR@A@@A@@@@mD@B
@P@@@@PKAd@@E@@@@D`@@T@@@@PBB@@@@@pA@@@@VP@jNh}E@@@@@P@@@@PKAT@@D@@@@tR
@G@@A@@@@mDp@@P@@@@pIA|C@@@@xA@D@@@@tR@A@@A@@@@mD@B@P@@@@PKAd@@E@@@@D`@
@T@@@@PBB@@@@@pA@@@@VP@jNh}E@@@@@P@@@@PKA@@@D@@@@tR@E@@A@@@@mDpA@P@@@@PKA
L@@D@@@@\R@@@@@@^@@A@@@@mD@@@P@@@@PKA`@@D@@@@tR@I@PA@@@@AHpO@E@@@@d`@
@@@@@\@@@@`ED`jCZ_A@@@@@D@@@@PP@M@@A@@@@BDP@@d@@@@`LJDLCFDP@@@@@p@`K@d@@@@`
LJD^@FDP@@@@@q@`K@P@@@@PKAT@@D@@@@tR@G@@A@@@@mDp@@P@@@@pIA|C@@@@xA@D@@@@t
R@@@@A@@@@mD@B@P@@@@PKAd@@E@@@@D`@@T@@@@PBB@@@@@pA@@@@VP@jNh}E@@@@@P@@@
@PKAT@@D@@@@tR@G@@A@@@@mDp@@P@@@@pIA|C@@@@xA@D@@@@tR@@@@A@@@@mD@B@P@@@@PK
Ad@@E@@@@D`@@T@@@@PBB@@@@@pA@@@@VP@jNh}E@@@@@P@@@@@AAt@@D@@@@HP@A@PB@@@
@rh`PMlU@A@@@@@C@n@@C@@@@rh`PMXv@C@@@@@cKq@`K@\A@n@@C@@@@rh`PMLYAC@@@@@cKr@
`K@\A@n@@C@@@@rh`PM|{AC@@@@@cKs@`K@\A@n@@C@@@@rh`PMp^BC@@@@@cKt@`K@\A@n@@C@
@@@rh`PMdACC@@@@@cKu@`K@\A@n@@C@@@@rh`PMXdCC@@@@@cKv@`K@\A@n@@C@@@@rh`PMLGD
C@@@@@cKw@`K@\A@n@@C@@@@rh`PM|iDC@@@@@cKx@`K@\A@n@@C@@@@rh`PMpLEC@@@@@cKy@`
K@\A@n@PB@@@@rh`PMlqEA@@@@DC@n@@A@@@@mDPA@P@@@@PKA\@@D@@@@tR@C@@A@@@@gDpO
@@@@`G@P@@@@PKA@@@D@@@@tR@H@@A@@@@mDPB@T@@@@P@B|CPA@@@@IH@@@@@@G@@@@XAAh
z`vW@@@@@@A@@@@mD`@@P@@@@PKAH@@D@@@@tR@B@@A@@@@mDPA@P@@@@PKA\@@D@@@@tR@C@@A
@@@@gDpO@@@@`G@P@@@@PKAH@@D@@@@tR@H@@A@@@@mDPB@T@@@@P@B|CPA@@@@IH@@@@@
@G@@@@XAAVyPaL\[C_p@A@@@@DDPC@P@@@@`@AD@@J@@@@HcBawpJLH@@@@@Ti]C@W@@A@@@@mD
`@@P@@@@PKAT@@D@@@@tR@G@@A@@@@mDp@@P@@@@pIA|C@@@@xA@D@@@@tR@B@@A@@@@mD@B@
P@@@@PKAd@@E@@@@D`@@T@@@@PBB@@@@@pA@@@@VP@jNh}E@@@@@P@@@@PKAH@@D@@@@tR@
B@@A@@@@mDPA@P@@@@PKA\@@D@@@@tR@C@@A@@@@gDpO@@@@`G@P@@@@PKAH@@D@@@@tR@H@@
A@@@@mDPB@T@@@@P@B|CPA@@@@IH@@@@@@G@@@@XAAS_`~@dqA[A@A@@@@DDPC@P@@@@`@AD
@@P@@@@lo@m~O@@Px@DN@oB@@@@@@@P@@@AIWZaqF@nFHA@@@@mD`A@h@@@@`LJ\|AtAPA@@@@f
aBTieB@D@@@@tR@B@@A@@@@pG`A@P@@@@PKAH@@D@@@@tR@E@@A@@@@mDpA@P@@@@PKAL@@D@@@
@\R@@@@@@^@@A@@@@mD`@@P@@@@PKA`@@D@@@@tR@I@PA@@@@AHpO@E@@@@d`@@@@@@\@
@@@`ED`jCZ_A@@@@@D@@@@tR@E@@A@@@@mDpA@P@@@@PKAL@@D@@@@\R@@@@@@^@@A@@@@mD
`@@P@@@@PKA`@@D@@@@tR@I@PA@@@@AHpO@E@@@@d`@@@@@@\@@@@`ED`jCZ_A@@@@@G@@@@
po@@@@@@@@@@@@A@@@@mD`A@P@@@@@|A`@@D@@@@tR@E@@A@@@@pGPB@P@@@@@AAt@@m@@@@\O@
@L@E@@@@@@@`@@@@@@H@@@H`@@@@@@H@@B@`@@@`@B@p@CL@@sMp@XjrpCp{CO@`BJi@@H`@Bp
@@@@@|O@@|@@@@@|O@Cp@@pCpO@D@@@@Pc@H@pA@@@@|KP@@@@@@@@@@P@@@@PKAd
@@I@@@@ho@E@@@@@@@@HB@D@@@@tR@J@pA@@@@[P`HDttAhLPNFP@@@@PKAX@@D@@@@tR@E
@@A@@@@mD`B@P@@@@PKAd@@E@@@@d`@@@@@@T@@@@P@B|C@A@@@@mD`A@\@@@@`EDdAAl\@L
CdeAP@@@@lo@Y}O@@@@@@@@dA@@@@@@@@@@HAIWZaqF@OA@@@@mDpB@P@@@@PKAl@@D@@@@PP
@M@@A@@@@BDP@@h@@@@`LJdu@aY`@@@@@FEcY@tE@D@@@@\R@@@@@@^@PA@@@@AHpO@E@
@@@d`@@@@@@\@@@@`ED`jCZ_A@@@@@D@@@@tR@E@@A@@@@mD`A@P@@@@PKAd@@D@@@@tR@J@pA@
@@@[P@TEPBVQ@xJP@@@@PKAX@@D@@@@tR@E@@A@@@@mD`B@P@@@@PKAd@@E@@@@d`@@@@@@T@@
@@P@B|C@A@@@@mD`A@\@@@@`ED\TASo`WD@pBD@@@@tR@K@@A@@@@mDpB@P@@@@@AAt@@D@@
@@HP@A@`B@@@@rhpaD`pBB@@@@XdLfAPW@P@@@@pIA|C@@@@xA@E@@@@D`@@T@@@@PBB@
@@@@pA@@@@VP@jNh}E@@@@@P@@@@PKAT@@D@@@@tR@F@@A@@@@mDPB@P@@@@PKAh@@G@@@@lAAX
T@HPxAAL|@A@@@@mD`A@P@@@@PKAT@@D@@@@tR@J@@A@@@@mDPB@T@@@@PBB@@@@@PA@@@@AHp
O@D@@@@tR@F@pA@@@@VPpCE|CfP@KOP@@@@PKAl@@D@@@@tR@K@@A@@@@DDPC@P@@@@`@AD@
@J@@@@HcBOQ@MOH@@@@`QsXF@]A@A@@@@gDpO@@@@`G@T@@@@P@B|CPA@@@@IH@@@@@@G@
@@@XAAhz`vW@@@@@@A@@@@mDPA@P@@@@PKAX@@D@@@@tR@I@@A@@@@mD`B@\@@@@pFDtJB]GqlG
dLDD@@@@tR@F@@A@@@@mDPA@P@@@@PKAh@@D@@@@tR@I@PA@@@@IH@@@@@@E@@@@D`@@P@@
@@PKAX@@G@@@@XAAdb@oQl{AiCAA@@@@mDpB@P@@@@PKAl@@D@@@@PP@M@@A@@@@BDP@@h@@@@`
LJP~AqCa@@@@@FQcY@tE@D@@@@\R@@@@@@^@PA@@@@AHpO@E@@@@d`@@@@@@\@@@@`ED`
jCZ_A@@@@@D@@@@tR@E@@A@@@@mD`A@P@@@@PKAd@@D@@@@tR@J@pA@@@@[PpoJPAAEgPNBP@@@
@PKAX@@D@@@@tR@E@@A@@@@mD`B@P@@@@PKAd@@E@@@@d`@@@@@@T@@@@P@B|C@A@@@@mD`A
@\@@@@`EDXkBsOPsIde@D@@@@tR@K@@A@@@@mDpB@P@@@@@AAt@@D@@@@HP@A@pC@@@@rh`}IDf
@E@@@@@UZ}@UZ@|F@e@`X@|F@e@@A@@@@gDpO@@@@`G@T@@@@P@B|CPA@@@@IH@@@@@@G@
@@@XAAhz`vW@@@@@@A@@@@mDPA@P@@@@PKAX@@P@@@@XbAO@`E@|O@@Tu@@@p\J@@@KP@@@
TxB@@PB@@@@zK@@@X@@@@@@@@@@b@@A@@@@mD@C@P@@@@PKAd@@H@@@@Tr@B@`AD@xB{MpjJP@@
@@PKAh@@D@@@@@_@L@@A@@@@mD`A@h@@@@@ICL@@YNpfJdu@wi`XC|kBD@@@@tR@E@@A@@@@mD`
A@`@@@@`IF|@@F@pA@PA@@@@IH@@@@@@E@@@@D`@@P@@@@PKAX@@D@@@@\R@_A@@
@@LH@jNh}EC@@@@xA@E@@@@D`@@T@@@@PBB@@@@@@A@@@@gDpW@@@@pBB@@@@@p@@@@@^
@PA@@@@AHpO@E@@@@d`@@@@@@P@@@@@|AD@@D@@@@@_@B@@A@@@@pG@@@P@@@@pIA|C@@@
@@@@
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% End /document/FJ8NUM04.wmf %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%