Susanna
Schellenberg
Journal
Articles:
"The
Situation-Dependency of Perception"
The Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming 2008)
I argue
that
perception is necessarily situation-dependent. The way an object is
must not
just be distinguished from the way it appears and the way it is
represented, but
also from the way it is presented given the situational features.
First, I
argue that the way an object is presented is best understood in terms
of
external, mind-independent, but situation-dependent properties of
objects.
Situation-dependent properties are exclusively sensitive to and
ontologically
dependent on the intrinsic properties of objects, such as their shape,
size,
and color, and the situational features, such as the lighting
conditions and
the perceiver’s location in relation to the perceived object. Second, I
argue
that perceiving intrinsic properties is epistemically dependent on
representing
situation-dependent properties. Recognizing situation-dependent
properties
yields four advantages. It makes it possible to embrace the motivations
that
lead to phenomenalism and indirect realism by recognizing that objects
are
presented a certain way, while holding on to the intuition that
subjects
directly perceive objects. Second, it acknowledges that perceptions are
not
just individuated by the objects they are of, but by the ways those
objects are
presented given the situational features. Third, it allows for a way to
accommodate the fact that there is a wide range of viewing conditions
or
situational features that can count as normal. Finally, it makes it
possible to
distinguish perception and thought about the same object with regard to
what is
represented.
"Action and Self-Location
in
Perception"
(PDF)
Mind, 116 (463), July 2007,
pp. 603-632.
I offer
an
explanation of how subjects are able to perceive the intrinsic spatial
properties of objects, given that subjects always perceive from a
particular
location. The argument proceeds in two steps. First, I argue that a
conception
of space is necessary to perceive the intrinsic spatial properties of
objects.
This conception of space is spelled out by showing that perceiving
intrinsic
properties requires perceiving objects as the kind of things that are
perceivable from other locations. Second, I show that having such a
conception
of space presupposes that a subject represent her location in relation
to
perceived objects. More precisely the thesis is that a subject
represents her
location as the location from which she both perceives objects and
would act in
relation to objects were she to act. So I argue that perception depends
on the
capacity to know what it would be to act in relation to objects.
Book
Chapters:
“Space,
Perspective,
and the Abstraction Condition”
forthcoming
in a volume edited by J. Schear, London:
Routledge.
"Sellarsian Perspectives
on
Perception and Non-Conceptual Content"
The
Self-Correcting Enterprise: Essays on Wilfrid Sellars, M. Lance,
M. Wolf
(eds), Rodopi 2006, pp. 173-196.
I
argue for a way of understanding the particularity of perception within
the
framework of a conceptual role semantics.
Work
in Progress:
"The
Particularity and Phenomenology
of Perceptual Experience"
Traditionally, there are two fundamentally different ways of thinking about perception. According to intentionalists, perception is essentially a matter of representing objects, properties, or a scene. According to relationalists, perception is essentially a matter of standing in an awareness or an acquaintance relation to objects, properties, or a scene. I aim to show that these two approaches are not incompatible and indeed that perception is best thought of as both representational and relational. Intentionalism can easily account for how a perception and a hallucination can be phenomenologically indistinguishable. By contrast, relationalism can easily account for the particularity of perceptual experience. I argue that any account of perceptual experience should explain both the particularity of perception and the possibility that a perception and a hallucination are phenomenologically indistinguishable. I argue that these two desiderata can be accommodated if the content of experience is understood in terms of potentially gappy content schemas. This way of thinking about the content of expereince makes it possible to acknowledge that a perception and a phenomenologically indistinguishable hallucination differ in content while recognizing that they have a common element.
"In
Defense of Perceptual Content"
It used
to be common
ground that perceptual experience represents the world as being one way
rather
than another. Recently this intuition has been questioned by austere
relationalists. With relationalists I argue that veridical
perceptions
essentially involve relations to material objects. But against austere
relationalists,
I argue that embracing this insight does not require conceiving of
perceptual
experience as non-representational. I present a way of thinking about
the
content of perceptual experience that does not fall prey to the
relationalist
criticisms of intentionalist accounts of perception. In short the idea
is that
the content of experience consists of an element that is
object-independent and
of an element that is object-dependent—at least in the case of a
veridical
perception.
"Introspection
and Particularity"
Perception
in
Perspective
(book project)
Unpublished
Comments:
Comments
on Tyler Doggett and Andy Egan: "Wanting Things You Don't Want"
presented at the Bellingham Summer Philosophy
Conference
2007
Comments
on Christopher Peacocke: "Mental Actions"
presented at the Peacocke
Conference, University of
Toronto 10/5/06