|
|
|
|
|
||
|
|
|
|
|
||
|
|
|
|
|
||
|
Susanna
Schellenberg |
|||||
|
|
|
|
|
||
|
|
|
|
|
||
|
Journal
Articles: |
|||||
|
|
|
|
|
||
|
|
"Minimalism
about Phenomenology". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,
forthcoming. |
|
|
||
|
|
|
I develop a view of
the common factor between subjectively indistinguishable perceptions and
hallucinations that avoids analyzing experiences as involving awareness
relations to abstract entities, sense-data, or any other peculiar entities.
The main thesis is that hallucinating subjects employ concepts (or analogous
nonconceptual structures), namely the very same concepts that in a
subjectively indistinguishable perceptual experience are employed as a
consequence of being related to external, mind-independent objects or property-instances.
These concepts and non-conceptual structures are identified with modes of
presentation types. Since a hallucinating subject is not related to any such
objects or property-instances, the concepts she employs remain unsaturated. I
argue that the phenomenology of hallucinations and perceptions can be
identified with employing concepts and analogous nonconceptual structures. By
doing so, I defend an ontologically minimalist view of the phenomenology of
experience that (1) satisfies the Aristotelian principle according to which
the existence of any type depends on its tokens and (2) amounts to a
naturalized view of the phenomenology of experience. |
|
||
|
|
|
|
|
||
|
|
"The
Situation-Dependency of Perception". The Journal of
Philosophy,
105 (2), Feb 2008, pp. 55-84. |
|
|
||
|
|
|
I
argue that perception is necessarily situation-dependent. The way an object
is must not just be distinguished from the way it appears and the way it is
represented, but also from the way it is presented given the situational
features. First, I argue that the way an object is presented is best
understood in terms of external, mind-independent, but situation-dependent
properties of objects. Situation-dependent properties are exclusively
sensitive to and ontologically dependent on the intrinsic properties of
objects, such as their shape, size, and color, and the situational features,
such as the lighting conditions and the perceiver’s location in relation to
the perceived object. Second, I argue that perceiving intrinsic properties is
epistemically dependent on representing situation-dependent properties.
Recognizing situation-dependent properties yields four advantages. It makes
it possible to embrace the motivations that lead to phenomenalism and
indirect realism by recognizing that objects are presented a certain way,
while holding on to the intuition that subjects directly perceive objects.
Second, it acknowledges that perceptions are not just individuated by the
objects they are of, but by the ways those objects are presented given the
situational features. Third, it allows for a way to accommodate the fact that
there is a wide range of viewing conditions or situational features that can
count as normal. Finally, it makes it possible to distinguish perception and
thought about the same object with regard to what is represented. |
|
||
|
|
|
|
|
||
|
|
"Action and Self-Location in
Perception". Mind, 116 (463), July 2007, pp. 603-632. (PDF) |
|
|
||
|
|
|
I
offer an explanation of how subjects are able to perceive the intrinsic
spatial properties of objects, given that subjects always perceive from a
particular location. The argument proceeds in two steps. First, I argue that
a conception of space is necessary to perceive the intrinsic spatial
properties of objects. This conception of space is spelled out by showing
that perceiving intrinsic properties requires perceiving objects as the kind
of things that are perceivable from other locations. Second, I show that
having such a conception of space presupposes that a subject represent her
location in relation to perceived objects. More precisely the thesis is that
a subject represents her location as the location from which she both
perceives objects and would act in relation to objects were she to act. So I
argue that perception depends on the capacity to know what it would be to act
in relation to objects. |
|
||
|
|
|
|
|
||
|
|
"Begriff,
Gehalt, Folgerung". Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 48 (5), 2000, pp. 780-789.
[Translated Title: Concept, Content, Inferences] |
|
|
||
|
|
|
|
|
||
|
Book
Chapters: |
|||||
|
|
|
|
|
||
|
|
“Externalism
and the Gappy Content of Hallucination”. Hallucination, ed. F. E. Macpherson,
Cambridge: MIT Press, forthcoming. |
|
|
||
|
|
|
|
|
||
|
|
“Self-Location
and the Asymmetry of Perceptual Evidence”. Perception, Action, and Consciousness,
ed. N. Gangopadhay, M. Madary, and F. Spicer, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, forthcoming. |
|
|
||
|
|
|
|
|
||
|
|
“Space
and Perspective”.
The Myth of the
Mental? ed.
J. Schear, London: Routledge, forthcoming. |
|
|
||
|
|
|
|
|
||
|
|
"Sellarsian Perspectives on Perception and Non-Conceptual Content". The Self-Correcting Enterprise: Essays on Wilfrid Sellars, ed. M. Lance, M. Wolf, Rodopi 2006, pp. 173-196. |
|
|
||
|
|
|
I argue for a way of understanding the particularity of perception within the framework of a conceptual role semantics. |
|
||
|
|
|
|
|
||
|
Review:
|
|
|
|
||
|
|
|
|
|
||
|
|
Review
of Making It
Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, by Robert
Brandom, Philosophischer
Literaturanzeiger 51, 1998, pp. 187-195. |
|
|
||
|
|
|
|
|
||
|
Unpublished
Comments: |
|
|
|
||
|
|
Comments
on Tyler Doggett and Andy Egan: "Wanting Things You Don't Want", presented at the
Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference 2007 |
|
|
||
|
|
|
|
|
||
|
|
Comments on Christopher Peacocke:
"Mental Actions", presented at the Peacocke Conference,
University of Toronto 10/5/06 |
|
|
||
|
|
|
|
|
||
|
|
|
|
|
||